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-ii-
Well, why do we study the history of any science? 
Current work, so one would think, will preserve 
whatever is still useful of the work of preceding 
generations...0It is certainly better to scrap out-, 
-worn inodes of thought than to stick to them indef­
initely. Nevertheless, we stand to profit from 
visits to -the lumber room provided we do not stay 
there too long.
Joseph A. Schumpeter
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CHAPTER- I
Jevons in Perspective
It is the curious habit of many students of economic 
theory to seek out those past economists in whose writings
might be found the first embryos of a given theory and to
impute to such men the eredit for having founded an entire
school of thoughto Thus we are wrongly informed that Adam
Smith "discovered” economic science, that the supply-cost 
and marginal utility approaches to value theory were orig­
inated by David Ricardo and William Stanley Jevons, 
respectively, and, finally, that Alfred Marshall, using 
his famous scissors, was the first to cut the value prob­
lem into two parts o Those who offer such unscholarly gen­
eralities appear to ignore the fact that economic ideas, 
like bedrock in a vast river, have come into being only 
through endless evolution, each generation adding its own 
new layer to the hardpan0 But economic science seems par­
ticularly amenable to the vague syllogizing of students 
largely because of its close alliance with common-sense 
reasoning,, ̂ It is this alliance which poses a barrier to
■̂ See Jo A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, 
Hew York Oxford University Press, 1954-, P« 9°
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our determining who the real originators are* We know, for 
example, that for many centuries laymen have intuitively 
understood the laws of supply and demand, and this makes it 
even more difficult to trace the fountainhead of supply- 
demand analysis., Who would venture to say that the 
writings of a 14-th century millwright or wool merchant con­
stitute the discovery of the theory of supply and demand?
It is the old case of "cogito, ergo I am an economic theo­
retician,, "
Such is the problem which confronts us in evaluating 
the contributions of William Stanley Jevons (1835-82) to 
the theory of value: how to adjudge the originality of 
these contributions in light of the achievements of his 
precursors and the criticisms of his successors»
Our purpose is not to discount the importance of the 
original ideas which Jevons conceived, but rather to ferret 
out those for which he deserves logical priority and to set 
them apart from other concepts which are defective in terms 
of modern theory„ This task is made no less difficult by 
the fact that many of Jevons* more original concepts are 
cloaked in loose, quasi-mathematical garb which does much 
to obscure their intended meanings. Then too, Jevons lacks
the literary facility of authors such as Edgeworth and
2Marshall; this also serves to discount his importance in 
2Jevons never held any delusions about his inadequate 
writing ability, though even this surpassed his competence
-3-
the history of economic doctrine, and has even led contem­
porary writers to misjudge his achievements.
Quite naturally, Jevons' writings reflect the influ- 
ence of certain intellectual ancestors, the most signifi­
cant of which are Bentham, Cournot and various early 
pioneers of marginal utility analysis. Though not properly 
classified as an economist, Jeremy Bentham (174-8-1832), one 
of the first English utilitarians, had a profound effect 
upon the writings of many nineteenth century economists.
The leader of a group known as the "Philosophical Radicals," 
Bentham sought to develop a science of human behavior 
applicable to polities, jurisprudence, economics, religion 
and other related disciplines. The major tenet of his
philosophy— "the greatest happiness of the greatest number,
4that is the measure of right and wrong" — is known to all 
students of economic history and is eloquently phrased in 
the first paragraph of his Introduction to the Principles 
of Morals and Legislation;
as a teacher. In his later years he wrote: "Sometimes I
have enjoyed lecturing, especially in logic, but for years 
past I have never entered the lecture room without a feel­
ing probably like that of going to the pillory" (Quoted in 
J. M. Keynes, Essays and Sketches in Biography, New York, 
Meridian Books’̂ 1956, p. 159) •
3.See T. W. Hutchison, A Review of Economic Doctrines, 
1870^1929, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1955, P° 14-.
4Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government and An Intro­
duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. 
Wilfrid Harrison, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 194-8, p. 125.
...Nature has placed mankind under the governance 
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It 
is for them alone to point out what we ought to 
do, as well as determine what we shall do...Every 
effort that we can make to throw off our subjec­
tion will serve but to demonstrate and confirm 
it.„.The principle of utility recognizes this sub­
jection and assumes it for the foundation of that 
system, the object of which is to rear the fabric 
of felicity by the hands of reason and law. Sys­
tems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds 
instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, 
in darkness instead of light.5
This principle of utility, or, as it is popularly termed, 
"hedonism," presupposes that all feelings are capable of 
scientific measurement, so that Bentham's utility emerges 
as some sort of "psychic reality" which can be known by 
simple introspection.
Jevons is disturbed by-Bentham*s cardinality assump­
tion, and tries to redefine utility in non-cardinal terms.
In lieu of Bentham*s proposition that utility is directly 
measurable, he offers the argument that utility can be mea­
sured indirectly by the observable effeets of a feeling, as 
consumers react to price changes. But what he fails to
7realize is that this also presupposes cardinal measurement.
(In 1890 Marshall made a similar mistake by defining utility 
in terms of consumer income.) The cardinality question was a nut
5Ibid.
^See ¥. S. Jevons' Theory of Political Economy, New 
York, Kelley & Millman, 1957* P» 12.
7'Eor an excellent statement on cardinal vs. ordinal 
measurement see Schumpeter, History, pp. 1060-1066.
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which Jevons was never quite able to crack, though it must
I . . . . .
be admitted that he^made an attempt in the first edition of 
8his Theory.
Modern theory has proven that the.alliance between
Benthamite hedonism and economics was, at best,-an unholy
one. Yet we must not overvalue the debt which Jevons owed
to Bentham. Contemporary writers, in an apparent attempt
at skimming the cream from the milk, suggest that Jevons'
theories can be divorced
from their...hedonistic basis without substan­
tial alteration of their essential features, and 
with a distinct gain in the favor of actuality.9
Jevons himself denies that the subjective valuations of one
person can be compared with those of someone else:
...I see no means by which such comparison can 
be accomplished....But even if we could compare 
the feelings of different minds, we should not 
need to do so; for one mind only affects another 
indirectly. Every event in the outward world is 
represented in the mind by a corresponding 
motive, and it is by the balance of these that 
the will is swayed....Each person is to other 
persons a portion of the outward world..Thus 
motives in the mind of A may give rise to phe­
nomena which may be represented by motives in 
the mind of B; but between A and B there is a 
gulf. Hence the weighing of motives must always 
be confined to the bosom of the individual.10
Jevons' allusion to the problems of interpersonal utility
8See p. 18.
9A. A. Young, "Jevons® Theory of Political Economy," 
American Economic Review, II, 1912, p. 578.
Jevons, Theory, p. 14-.
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comparison provides a key to his analysis. Whereas Bentham 
had inferred that such comparison was possible and, indeed, 
necessary for the purposes of analysis, Jevons makes an 
attempt to avoid this. He also tries to free himself from
the ethical questions which were posed by Bentham and other 
early hedonists. To the extent that he was successful in 
overcoming these two factors, we are able to omit the util­
itarianism from his writings without appreciably injuring 
their scientific content.
Of no lesser importance was the debt which Jevons owed 
to Augustin Cournot (1801-77)» A French writer who 
pioneered econometric method, Cournot was not widely read 
by English economists until the latter part of the nine­
teenth century. One of the first English acknowledgements
of Cournot's major work, Recherches sur les Principles
/ /Mathematiques de la Theories des Richesses, appears m  the
second edition of Jevons’ Theory (1879):
...This work must occupy a remarkable position in 
the history of (mathematical economics). It is 
strange that it should have remained for me among 
Englishmen to discover its value....I procured a 
copy of the work as far back as 1872, but have 
only recently studied it with sufficient care to 
form any definite opinion upon its value.H
Ibid., pp. xxix-xxx. After the writings of Cournot, 
Dupuit, and others were unearthed, Jevons felt that all 
questions of priority had finally been solved: "...these
questions are really of little or no importance to us now 
....We are all shelved on the matter of priority, except, 
of course, as regards details and general method of expo­
sition, etc." (Letters and Journal of W. Stanley Jevons, 
ed. H. A. Jevons, London, MacMillan & Co., 1886, p. 409)
-7-
Many of the changes and corrections which Jevons undertook
in his second edition, especially as regards the notation
of marginal utility, might he attributed to the influence
of this earlier writer<> While admitting that Cournot's
Recherches was so significant that it should be known to
all, Jevons confessed that his own knowledge of mathematics
precluded a complete understanding of its contents. It
cannot be sufficiently stressed that Jevons was never the
mathematician he hoped to be, as can be seen in his treat-
12ment of simultaneous equations in Chapter 17 of the 
Theory, It is only unfortunate that he was so poorly 
equipped to handle the differential calculus which he con­
sidered so essential. As Young points out, Jevons1 "use
14of the mathematical method is more apparent than real," 
Aside from his poor understanding of mathematics per se, 
Jevons also misunderstood the real nexus between mathe­
matics and economics, N According to Eckard, Jevons appar­
ently believed that
...economic relationships follow mathematical 
laws through an intricate succession of rela­
tionships. I grant that mathematical symbols 
are a very convenient aid in expressing the 
results of reasoning. But I refuse to concede 
that a mathematical operation can be validly
12Eor a discussion of the meaning of simultaneous 
equations and their importance to economics see Schumpeter, 
History, p. 970«
15See Jevons, Theory, pp. 114-118.
^Young, "Jevons' Theory," p. 588.
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employed to prove an economic proposition,- even 
though it may make an excellent illustration,15
The general result is that Jevons, the mathematician, fre­
quently outdistances Jevons, the economist, and sound anal­
ysis is sometimes left to fend for itself,
xJevons was not the first major writer to treat marginal 
utility. Others before him, notably Senior, Whately,
Lloyd, ^  and Gossen, had broken ground for this conceptual 
device; what is remarkable is that only a handful of these
• • TOmen--Gossen and Senior were among them --were known to 
Jevons, In the preface to the second edition of the Theory 
he acknowledges several unnoticed writers for having influ­
enced his thought: Dionysius Lardner, whose treatment of
demand in the Railway Economy served as a model for Jevons" 
"laws of utility"; Richard Jennings, whose Natural Elements 
of Political Economy provided Jevons with insights into 
utilitarian measurement; and, of lesser influence
15Eo V. Eckard, Economics of W. S, Jevons, Washington,
D, C., American Council on Public Affairs, 194-0, p, 94,
^These first three writers represent the so-called 
"Oxford Utility School,” which flourished during the 18501 s. 
Prior to the appearance of Jevons® Theory and Gossen*s 
Entwickelung der Gesetze des men-schlichen Verkehrs (Berlin, 
Prager, 1854) they were considered the foremost exponents 
of the marginal utility concept. See Hutchison, Review,
p„ 14; also Schumpeter, History, pp. 483-486,
17'There is a remarkable resemblance between the 
writings of Jevons on the one hand and those of both Senior 
and Gossen on the other. However, Jevons arrived at his 
theory of value quite independently and did not know of 
these works until after the first edition of the•Theory.
See Jevons, ibid., pp. xxxii-xxxix.
von Thunen, MacLeod, Cliffe Leslie and Ingram,,
It is a credit to Jevons* genius that he was ahle to 
gather up the scattered raw materials which these writers 
had left behind and to employ them in the erection of his 
own theoretical structure. At the same time we must 
acknowledge the fact that several of his building materials 
were heuristieally imperfect and should have been discarded 
at the outset. Like Senior before him, Jevons made only a 
slight attempt at analyzing the process of individual valu-
19ation and the subjective factors which influence it. He
wrongly identified marginal utility with marginal demand
and market.price, and actually had very little to say about
20pricing at all. Furthermore, he treated each individ­
ual’s utility as a function of a single commodity, rather 
than all the commodities involved in a person's consumption
habits; this too was a characteristic error of the early 
21utilitarians.
The following analysis will attempt to uncover
1 PThe writings of other economists to whom Jevons was 
indebted are. listed in Appendix V to the Theory. See 
ibid., pp. 322-342.
19See H. J. Davenport, Value and Distribution, Chicago 
University of Chicago Press, 1908, p. 334.
2QIbid., p. 336.
21See Hutchison, History, pp. 114-115. Edgeworth cor­
rected this error by relating utility to a consumer’s 
entire consumption or Versorgungslage. For further infor­
mation the reader is referred to F. Y. Edgeworth, Mathemat­
ical Psychics, London, C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1881, pp. 31-42
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critieal flaws such as these. Some of the major questions 
to he posed are: Given a distrust of the, older classical
economics, and the rudimentary tools of marginal analysis, 
how did Jevons trace the outline of a new theory based upon 
a union of mathematics and English utilitarianism? Does 
this new organon represent an improvement over the classi­
cal position on value? And finally, are the criticisms 
which Marshall directs at devonian theory consistent with 
twentieth century analysis, or is Marshall guilty of 
Ricardian "wrong-headedness," as Schumpeter would have us 
believe?
The reader will note that this paper is initially 
divided into two parts: Part I is devoted to a synopsis of 
Jevonian marginal utility analysis and has been drawn 
largely from Jevons* Theory (5th Edition, 1957)» which 
forms the core of his deduction; in Part II the author 
offers a presentation and evaluation of Marshallian criti­
cisms of the Theory.
Part I
Chapter II, "The Utilitarian Framework," treats 
Jevons* statements on the measurement and dimensions of 
utility, together with his formulation of the "laws of 
utility."
Chapter III, "A Preface to Distribution Theory: Con­
sumer Allocation," demonstrates how Jevons applied the mar­
ginal utility apparatus to several simple allocation
-11-
problems .
Chapter IV, "Marginal Utility and the Exchange Mecha­
nism," furnishes an outline of Jevons' theory of exchange. 
Important points to he touched on include: (1) the "law of
indifference"; (2) "trading bodies"; and (3) the derivation 
of exchange equations. An attempt is made at tracing out 
the process whereby Jevons extended the barter concept to 
the more complex cases of exchange, involving many commodi­
ties and trading bodies.
Part II
Chapter V, "The Marshallian Compromise," diagnoses the 
criticisms which Marshall directed at Jevons' theoretical 
work. Emphasis is placed on the following critical points: 
(1) Are "real costs" an implicit assumption in Jevons' 
Theory? (2) Are Marshall's criticisms of Jevons' "poor 
technique" valid, or do they obscure the fact that Jevons' 
real contribution lies in his delineation of marginal util­
ity, not in the method by which this delineation was accom­
plished? (3) Is Marshall justified in rebuking Jevons for 
his so-called "hedonics"? and finally (4) Does Jevons 
really fail to comprehend the role of time periods in eco­
nomic analysis as Marshall implies? Each of these points 
will be treated in turn.
In conclusion, then, we will be concerned with 
appraising Jevons' contributions to the area of pure theory
-12- .
22both in terms of Marshall's comments and those of Contem­
ptporary critics, including Schumpeter, Hutchison, Roll and 
Stigler.
One wonders why Jevons was better known during his 
lifetime for his statistical investigations into the busi­
ness cycle and for various papers on currency and
...... 24-finance, rather than for his eminently more important 
theoretical writings. The reasons for this can be traced 
to two sources. The first lies in the nature of Jevons 
himself:
...Jevons left hardly any personal pupils, a 
fact that was in turn due not only to lack of 
opportunity (he never taught in a strategic 
position) but also to his amiable modesty or 
lack of assertiveness....But it is also true 
that his work in economic theory lacks finish.
His performance was not up to his vision.
Brilliant conceptions and profound insights....
were never properly worked out; they were 
stated as apertjus and so intermingled with old 
stuff as to look almost superficial.25
22Most of Marshall's criticisms have been drawn from 
his Principles of Economics (1890) and a posthumously pub­
lished work entitled The Memorials of Alfred Marshall 
(1925).
2^The reader should be aware of the fact that Schum­
peter looked more favorably upon Jevons and the Austrians 
than many other contemporary critics; quite often his crit­
icisms of Marshall reflect this bias, as we shall see in 
Part II.
24See W. S. Jevons, Investigations in Currency and 
Finance, London, MacMillan & Co., 1884; also his Money and 
the Mechanism of Exchange, London, H. S. King & Go., 1878; 
and Principles of Economics, London, MacMillan & Co., 1905.
^Schumpeter, History, p. 826.
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But there is another, perhaps more significant reason:
Jevons, as an "originator" in the hest sense of the word,
felt impelled to break with a tradition which had become
the life blood of English economists., Marshall, in the
role of a national leader, was obliged to defend this
tradition, to protect it from its detractors, and to dispel
27forever the "mists of ephemeral criticism." ' It was inev­
itable that the sparks of a "devonian revolution" would be 
stamped out before they had time to kindle the fires of a 
new English school.
To test the mettle of Jevons' thesis and Marshall's 
antithesis the following is directed.
2^See ibid., p. 840.
27See ibid., pp. 920-921.
PART I
JEVONIAH VALUE THEORY
In the last few months I have fortunately struck 
out what I have no doubt is the true Theory of 
Economy, so thorough-going and consistent, that 
I cannot now read other books on the subject with­
out indignation.
William Stanley Jevons
CHAPTER II
The Utilitarian Framework
The genesis of Jevonian value theory can he traced to 
1862 and the presentation of Jevons' "Brief Account of a 
General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy" before 
the British Association at Cambridge. It was Jevons' hope 
that the paper, however reminiscent of earlier writings by 
Whately, Senior, and Lloyd, might effect a reappraisal of 
Ricardian doctrine, which for more than a half-century had 
served as the sine qua non of economic science. To his 
disappointment the paper failed to attract, even moderate 
attention. An exclusive reliance upon hedonistic ideas to 
explain value, a proclivity to dress economics in the 
"heavy" armor of the calculus, a disavowal of the popular 
cost-of-production principles of Ricardo and Mill— these 
were the ingredients of a pastry which members of the Asso­
ciation did not even care to sample:
A true theory of economy can only be attained by 
going back to the great springs of human action—  
the feelings of pleasure and pain.1
Jevons, Theory, p. 304. J. A. La Nauze has estab­
lished February 1*5, 1860 as the date Jevons discovered the 
significance of marginal utility (See R. S. Howey, The 
Rise of the Marginal Utility School, 1870-1889, Lawrence,
-15-
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As if to acknowledge its indifference, the Association dis­
missed the paper perfunctorily and never offered to publish 
it.
Publication of Jevons* aper^u was deferred until 1866,
when it was printed in extenso in the Journal of the Sta-
2tistical Society of hondor^. Yet this proved no more 
fruitful than had the 1862 presentation and, largely as a 
result of critical indifference, Jevons temporarily put 
pure theory to one side and resumed his statistical inves­
tigations into commercial crises.
When in 1868 (and again in 1870) Fleming Jenkin pub-
xlished several articles^ bearing close similarity to 
Jevons* original abstract on value, Jevons recognized the 
need for the immediate publication of a more complete 
statement of his principles of economics. During the 
hurried months between December, 1870, and August, 1871* he 
addressed his energies solely to this task, quite frequently 
to the detriment of his health. The final product of his 
labors, the Theory of Political Economy, was accepted for 
publication by the MacMillan Company in September, 1871.
Kansas, University of Kansas Press, I960, pp. 1, 225).
2W. S. Jevons, "Brief Account of a General Mathemati­
cal Theory of Political Economy," Journal of the Statisti-
• cal Society of London, XXIX, 1866, pp. 282-287.
^See Fleming Jenkin, The Graphic Representation of the 
Laws of Supply and Demand, and Other Essays on Political 
Economy, London, London School Reprints, 1^31«
-17-
(1) The Measurement and Dimensions of Utility
Comparison of Jevons' Theory with his. 1862 paper shows
that all the original fibers remain, occasionally distended,
frequently rewoven, always strengthened:
...Repeated reflection and inquiry have led me to 
the- somewhat novel opinion, that value depends 
entirely upon utility,.,.that we have only to 
trace out carefully the natural laws of the vari­
ation of utility...in order to arrive at a satis­
factory theory of exchange, of which the ordinary 
laws of supply and demand are a necessary conse­
quence. 4-
Moreover,
...it is clear- “that Economics, if it is to he a 
science at all, must he a mathematical science 
.... simply because it deals with (variations 
in) quantities.5
Jevons well realizes that the feasibility of applying the 
calculus to human feelings might be questioned. The mind 
cannot add or subtract feelings, thereby effecting a bal­
ance between what is pleasurable and what is painful.
Jevons denies, therefore, that utility is measurable in 
the cardinal sense:
...There is no unit of labour, or suffering, or 
enjoyment.o..I have granted that we can hardly 
form the conception of a unit of pleasure or 
pain, so that the numerical expression of quan­
tities of feeling seems to be out of question.6
Yet the implication is made that while utility cannot be
4Jevons, Theory, pp. 1-2. 
^Ibid., p. 3°
^Ibid., pp. 7? 12.
-18-
measure d directly, it might he measured indirectly hy its
7observable effects. He also implies that, as more and 
more statistical data becomes generally available to econ­
omists, they eventually would be able to quantify utility. 
For the present, however, Jevons proposes that money-price
Qwill serve as a fairly accurate "measuring rod of utility."
At least two major errors in Jevons* initial state­
ments might be noted. In the first place he implies that 
the utility of every commodity to its consumer is some 
function of the quantity of that commodity alone, rather 
than of total consumption. In simple mathematical nota­
tion an individual's total utility could be written: 
f(x1) + g(x£) + h(x^) + ...., 
where x^, X£, x^, ... represent commodities. Walras and 
Henger were also guilty of this error. The-more correct 
approach can be credited to Edgeworth, who established
7 ........'Stigler observes that Jevons was a good deal more 
skeptical of the measurability of utility in his first 
(1871) than in his second (1879) edition; e.g., in the 
1879 edition he deletes the following: "I confess that it
seems to me difficult even to imagine- how such estimations 
(of utility) and summations can be made with any approach 
to accuracy. Greatly though I admire the clear and pre­
cise notions of Bentham, I know not where his numerical 
data are to be found" (ibid., p. 12). See Stigler, "The 
Development of Utility Theory," Journal of Political Econ­
omy, LVIII, 1950, p. 34-1.
8Jevons, Theory, p. 13. Jevons explains that he 
"never attempt(s) to estimate the whole pleasure gained by 
purchasing a commodity; the theory merely express(es) that, 
when a man has purchased enough, he would derive equal 
pleasure from the possession of a small quantity more as he 
would from the money price of it" (ibid'. ).
-19-
that an individual's utility is a function of all commodi­
ties involved in his consumption pattern.
A somewhat more subtle error of Jevons' is found in 
his statements on interpersonal utility comparison. He 
emphatically states that this is impossible:
...The reader will find...that there is never,
• in any single sentence, an attempt made to com­
pare the amount of feeling in one mind with that 
in another....Every mind is... inscrutable to 
every other mind, and no common denominator of 
feeling seems possible.9
Yet several such comparisons are made later on in the
Theory when he passes on to a discussion of exchange, as
will be noted in Chapter IV. The conditions by which one
feeling is said to be greater than another had been set
down by Bentham as early as 1823; Jevons is unequivocal in
his acceptance of them:
...To a person considered by himself, the value 
of a pleasure or pain, considered by itself, 
will be greater or less according to the four 
following circumstances: —
(1) Its intensity.
(2) Its duration.
(3) Its certainty or uncertainty.
(4) Its propinquity or remoteness.
Strictly speaking, every feeling has two dimensions: 
intensity and duration. Whether pleasure or pain, a feel­
ing must last for a certain period of time, and while it
q/Ibid., p. 14. See also Jevons' letter ot Cairnes, 
January,. 1872 (Reprinted in R. D. Black's "Jevons and 
Cairnes," Economica, XXVII, August, I960, p. 228).
10Bentham, Fragment, p. 151.
-20-
lasts, it must “be more or less intense,, The anticipation 
of future events must also be considered, as a source of 
satisfaction: the more developed a person becomes mentally .
and socially, the more important his anticipation of future 
feelings will be. Yet the uncertainty of future events 
will tend to cause even the most civilized individual to 
discount them.
Given these circumstances of feeling, everyone will
act
 ...to satisfy (his) wants to the utmost with the
least effort— to procure the greatest amount of 
what is desirable at the expense of the least 
that is undesirable.il
All human conduct will turn upon this innate desire to max­
imize positive feelings, or, what is the same thing, to 
minimize negative ones. This is the key to mathematical 
treatment of economic concepts: as a science of human
behavior, economics differs from other social sciences in 
being a calculus of feeling, treating maximum and minimum 
values.
Bentham1 s schema can be extended to define certain 
terms relevant to the science of economics. Commodity is
given to mean "any object, substance, action, or service,
' ' 12 which can afford pleasure or ward off pain," and utility,
the abstract ability which is possessed by a commodity to
Jevons, Theory, p. 57«
12Ibid., pp. 57~38.
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satisfy some desire. Jevons warns that utility is not a
quality inherent in the nature of things, as the writings
%   .........................
of Smith and other "Classicists" imply; rather, it is "a 
circumstance of things arising out of their relation to 
man's requirements."1-̂ To a thirsty man a quart of water 
has a very high degree of utility; yet, after drinking all 
the water he requires, a point of satiety is reached 
beyond which any additional water has zero utility. Con­
sequently, "...utility is not proportional to commodity; 
the very same articles vary in utility according as we 
already possess more or less of the same article."
Conversely, discommodity refers to those objects which 
possess the quality of causing inconvenience or harm; ashes 
and sewage are good examples. As to the abstract concept, 
that is, the opposite or negative of utility, Jevons uses 
the term disutility, a notion which, according to Schumpeter, 
he was the first to develop.^
(2) The Law of the Variation of Utility
Since utility is measured by the additions made to an
I5Ibid., p. 43.
14Ibid., p. 44.
15. ^See Schumpeter, History, p. 1057° However original 
the idea of "disutility" seems, it is, nonetheless, con- 
.fusing at times. "Walras" treatment was more elegant— he 
introduced the marginal utility of leisure in complete sym­
metry to the theory of consumption— but not much more 
instructive" (Stigler, "Utility Theory," p. 321).
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individual's happiness, and such happiness is given as var­
iable over time, Jevons proposes that certain natural laws 
of the variation of utility can be formulated. The deduc­
tion of these principles and the application of them to 
distribution and exchange processes comprise the largest 
segment of Jevons' Theory.
The "Law of the Variation of Utility" is predicated 
upon the aforementioned fact that utility bears no propor­
tional relationship to commodity:
o..Utility may be treated as a quantity of two 
dimens.ions, one dimension consisting in the quan­
tity of the commodity and the other in the inten­
sity of the effect produced upon the consumer.16
Suppose a day's supply of food to be divided into ten equal
.
parts. ' The utility of the first two-tenths is infinitely 
great, since these portions are absolutely essential to sup­
porting life. The third portion, while less necessary than 
the first two, is highly desired; the fourth, of less sig­
nificance; and the fifth, a matter of indifference. As 
successive portions are consumed, the degree of utility
Jevons, Theory, p. 47.
171 The division of a commodity into ten portions is 
purely arbitrary: "If we had taken twenty or a hundred or
more equal-parts , the same -general principle would hold 
true, namely, that each small portion would be less useful 
and necessary than the last. The law may be considered to 
hold true theoretically, however small the increments are 
made;- and in this way we shall at last reach -a figure which 
is undistinguishable from a continuous curve" (ibid., 
pp. 47-48). This qualification is important as far as 
aggregate consumption is concerned, which will vary by 
quantities which are infinitely small compared with the 
total consumption.
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attaching to each tenth will diminish, each increment 
becoming less necessary than the previous one. Jevons does 
not pretend to be the originator of the concept of dimin­
ishing utility, and notes that earlier writers, such as 
Senior in his "Law of Variety" and Banfield with his "Law 
of the Subordination of Wants," had given the principle a
*| O
less rigorous statement.
19The concept can easily be translated to a diagram. 
Measuring quantity of commodity on the horizontal axis (OX), 
and the degree of utility, or intensity of effect upon the 
consumer, on the vertical axis (OY), Jevons was one of the 
first economists to illustrate this principle:
FIGURE I
*|0Schumpeter traces the concept to an even earlier 
writer, F. Galiani: "What separates Galiani from Jevons...
is, first, that he lacked the concept of marginal utility... 
and, second, that he failed to apply his analysis to the 
problems of cost and distribution" (History, p. 301).
19To avoid repetition, the author has combined Jevons' 
Figures 3 and 4 (Theory, pp. 46, 49) in the above diagram,
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...The law of the variation of the degree of util­
ity of food may thus he represented by a continuous 
curve pbq.. .and the perpendicular height of each 
point of the curve above the line ox, represents 
the degree of utility of the commodity when a cer­
tain amount has been consumed.20
(3) Hie Law of the Variation of the Final Degree of Utility
A careful distinction must be made between the total
utility arising from the consumption of any commodity and
the degree of utility attaching to any given portion of it.
In terms of Figure I these are shown by an area, aa'b’b ,
and a line, a'b*. respectively. The total utility of the
food individuals consume consists in maintaining life and
is infinitely great; degree of utility, on the other hand,
relates to changes in the quantity of commodity and total
utility. In mathematical notation, if x is the quantity of
commodity, or the independent variable, and u is the total
utility arising from the consumption of x, or the dependent
variable, then the degree of utility is
...the differential coefficient of u considered 
as a function of x, and will itself be another
function of x.„..(or, symbolically) a u ....(and
21 A xat the limit) du .
dx
Degree of utility is important to Jevons only as regards
Figure I.
20Ibid., p. 48.
21Ibid., p. 51®
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t h e  l a s t  i n c r e m e n t  c o n s u m e d ,  o r  t h e  f i n a l  d e g r e e  o f  u t i l ­
i t y , T h i s  a p p e a r s  a s  t h e  r a t i o  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t o t a l
utility to the increase in the quantity of commodity at the 
22margin. Failure to distinguish between total utility and 
final degree of utility had been the source of much con­
fusion in economic thinking prior to Jevons' time.
  Given this distinction,
 . ..we may state as a general law, that the degree
o f  u t i l i t y  v a r i e s  w i t h  t h e  q u a n t i t y  o f  c o m m o d i t y ,
" anĉ  ultimately decreases as that quantity 
increases. No commodity can be named whieh we 
continue to desire with the same force, whatever 
be the quantity already in use or possession.23
'■ 24Jevons accords credit to Jennings for having first appre­
ciated the importance of this "Law of the Variation of the
 .
Final Degree of Utility." He implies, as did Jennings
b e f o r e  h i m ,  t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  i s  f o u n d e d  o n  t w o  p a r a m e t e r s :
in the first place, all wants are capable of satiety; and, 
secondly, as the satisfaction produced by one commodity 
diminishes, this good cannot be transferred to another use 
in order to achieve the greater satisfaction it initially 
produced, or, in other words, different commodities are not 
perfectly substitutable for one another in the satisfaction
22
A l t h o u g h  J e v o n s  n e v e r  u s e d  t h e  t e r m  " m a r g i n a l  u t i l ­
i t y , "  t h i s  i s  w h a t  h e  i s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  i n  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
t h e  " f i n a l  d e g r e e  o f  u t i l i t y . "  S c h u m p e t e r  c r e d i t s  v o n  
W i e s e r  w i t h  h a v i n g  i n v e n t e d  t h e  f o r m e r  p h r a s e  ( G r e n z n u t z e n ), 
H i s t o r y , p .  1055-
23̂
J e v o n s ,  T h e o r y , p .  5 3 °
24
S e e  R i c h a r d  J e n n i n g s ,  N a t u r a l  E l e m e n t s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  
E c o n o m y , L o n d o n ,  L o n g m a n s ,  1855 •
25of certain wants. ^
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(4) Notation of Utility
Expressing the dimensions of economic quantities is a 
task no less difficult than the measurement of other physi­
cal quantities; in many respects economic notation is even 
more troublesome, since the science must delineate certain 
quantities in terms of rates of change, as in.the case of 
compound interest determination. Apropos of utilitarian
measurement, the economist is confronted with the problem 
that the final degree of utility is an instantaneous state, 
quite independent of time. That is to say, time enters 
only as a negative factor. How then can we distinguish 
between instantaneous final degree of utility, on the one 
hand, and total utility, which is given as a function of 
both intensity and duration, on the other?
Jevons proposes that the final degree of utility will
25■'In this writer's opinion Jevons made a more impor­
tant contribution to the literature when he extended his 
Law of the Variation of the Final Degree of Utility in his 
Principles of Economics. In this work the principle is 
placed in a truer context, the monetary economy; it becomes 
an assumption upon which the law of demand is founded:
"When sugar is cheapened larger quantities in the whole will 
be demanded; this will arise from some who have already used 
it using more, from some who did not use any beginning to 
use it" (Principles, p. 57) • Jevons also allows for the 
variability of income among various classes: "The general
rule that as a commodity is cheapened its demand is 
increased...also depends upon the fact that the poorer 
classes of society are far more numerous than the richer, 
so that the cheapening brings it within a constantly 
expanding area of buyers" (ibid., p. 58)•
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u l t i m a t e l y  d e p e n d  u p o n  t h e  r a t e  o f  s u p p l y  o f  a  g i v e n  c o m ­
m o d i t y .  T h i s  r a t e  c a n  h e  d e n o t e d  a s  M T ~ \  w h e r e  M  i s  t h e  
a b s o l u t e  a m o u n t  o f  c o m m o d i t y ,  a n d  T - 1 , n e g a t i v e  t i m e .  I f  
U ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  u t i l i t y ,  i s  m u l t i p l i e d  b y  M T ~ ^ ~ , t h e  
r e s u l t i n g  n o t a t i o n ,  M U T ~ ^ , w i l l  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  r e a l  i n s t a n ­
t a n e o u s  s t a t e  o f  f e e l i n g .
. . . T h e  k i n d  o f  q u a n t i t y  t h u s  s y m b o l i z e d  b y  MUT~~*~ 
m u s t  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  m e a n i n g  s o  m u c h  c o m m o d i t y  
p r o d u c i n g  a  c e r t a i n  a m o u n t  o f  p l e a s u r a b l e  e f f e c t  
p e r  u n i t  o f  t i m e . 2 6
H o w e v e r ,  J e v o n s  w a r n s  t h a t  t h i s  i n s t a n t a n e o u s  s t a t e  o f  
f e e l i n g  m u s t  n o t ,  a s  h a d  b e e n  d o n e  b y  v a r i o u s  m e m b e r s  o f  
t h e  O x f o r d  U t i l i t y  S c h o o l ,  b e  c o n f u s e d  w i t h  t h e  t o t a l  q u a n ­
t i t y  o f  u t i l i t y :
. . . W e  m u s t  m u l t i p l y  t h i s  l a s t  s y m b o l  b y  T  i n  
o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  d i m e n s i o n s  o f  u t i l i t y  o r  
q u a n t i t y  o f  p l e a s u r e  p r o d u c e d .  B u t  i n  m a k i n g  
t h i s  m u l t i p l i c a t i o n ,  H U T - 1  r e d u c e s  t o  H U . . . .  
t h u s  t i m e  e l i m i n a t e s  i t s e l f  a n d  w e  a r r i v e  a t  a  
q u a n t i t y  o f  t w o  d i m e n s i o n s . ^ 7
I n  t h i s  s o m e w h a t  p r o l i x  a t t e m p t  a t  c l a r i f y i n g  p r e v i o u s
s t a t e m e n t s  o n  t h e  d i m e n s i o n s  o f  v a l u e ,  J e v o n s  m e r e l y
o b s c u r e s  a n  o b v i o u s  f a c t :  t h a t  t h e  m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  o f  a
c o m m o d i t y  i s  t h e  f i r s t  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .
26J e v o n s ,  T h e o r y , p .  6 6 .
271 I b i d ., p p .  6 6 - 6 7 •  W i c k s t e e d  t a k e s  J e v o n s  t o  t a s k  
f o r  a n  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  u s e -  o f  m a t h e m a t i c a l  r e a s o n i n g :
" . . . i f  w e  s a y  w i t h - J e v o n s  t h a t  t o t a l  u t i l i t y  h a s  t w o  d i m e n ­
s i o n s ,  M U ,  w e  m u s t ,  I  t h i n k ,  a d d  t h a t  o n e  o f  t h e s e  d i m e n ­
s i o n s ,  U ,  i s  a  r a t i o  a n d  n o t  p r o p e r l y  a  d i m e n s i o n  a t  a l l ” 
( P .  H .  W i c k s t e e d ,  " O n  C e r t a i n  P a s s a g e s  i n  J e v o n s *  T h e o r y  
o f  P o l i t i c a l  E c o n o m y , "  Q u a r t e r l y  J o u r n a l  o f  E c o n o m i c s ,  III, 
1 8 8 9 ,  p .  303T*
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What promises to "be a lesson in illumination becomes an 
exercise in confusion!
The history of economic theory holds many examples of 
writers who persisted in confusing marginal and total util­
ity. Smith had spoken of both "exchange value" and "use 
value," the former arising out of the amount of labor 
embodied in the production of a commodity, and the latter, 
from a commodity's "intrinsic" worth. Mill slightly 
improved on Smith's theory by presenting "exchange value" 
as a relationship:
Value is a relative term. The value of a thing
means the quantity of some other thing, or of
things in general, which it exchanges for.28
But what precisely is value relative to? Jevons asks. If 
value implies a relation, how can it be "some other thing"? 
Similarly, how can a commodity "possess" intrinsic value, 
as though there were an abstract "thing" which lies within 
it? To be sure, there are certain qualities inherent in
gold and diamonds which will influence their value, but
such intrinsic qualities are not synonymous with the term 
"value." Rather, this word "...merely expresses the cir­
cumstance of (a commodity's) exchanging in a certain ratio
29for some other substance."
From the fragmentary definitions of his predecessors
. J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, London. 
Longmans, 1936, p. 4-78.
29 Jevons, Theory, p. 77*
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Jevons discerns three distinct meanings which have tradi­
tionally been confused:
(1) Value in use = total utility;
(2) Esteem = final degree of utility;.
(3) Purchasing power = rati© of exchange.
Eor economic theory to take on any sort of clarity in the 
future Jevons maintains that one must avoid use of the term 
nvalue" altogether, and substitute these meanings in its 
stead. He claims the last term, "ratio of exchange," as 
his own invention, though.Le Trosne and Condillac utilized 
a similar one (le rapport d'echange).
Employing his earlier notations, Jevons gives symbolic 
statement to the three terms. Smith's "value in use," or 
total utility, is the integral of U*dM and its dimensions 
are HU. "Esteem," or the degree of utility, has a single 
dimension, U. Finally, "purchasing power," the ratio of 
exchange, is given as unity, since it is without dimension, 
and is written as H°.
3°Ibid., p. 81.
31 ̂The reader will note that Jevons reverts to using 
the term in a later discussion. See "Footnotes to Exchange: 
The 'True' Origin of Value," p. 65 •
CHAPTER III
A Preface to Distribution Theory;
Consumer Allocation
...In 1870 there was no theory of distribution.
Most English economists after Smith devoted sep­
arate chapters to rent, wages, and. profits, but 
without important exception such chapters were 
only descriptive of the returns to the three 
most important social classes of contemporary 
England.1
The Jevonian position on distribution has been the
subject of much controversy since it was originally stated
in the first edition of the Theory. Several authors, .
2 3including Stigler and Roll, question the originality of
Jevons' distribution theory, viewing it as little more than
a"warmed-over Classicism." At the other extreme Hutchison
5and Davenport^ regard it as a.major contribution to the 
literature. This apparent redundancy is at once explained
J. Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories, 
Hew York, MacMillan & Co., 1941, p. 2.
^Ibid.., p . 14.
^Erie Roll, A History of Economic Thought, Englewood 
Cliffs, H. J., Prentice-Hall, 1956, p. 383.
4-Hutchison, Review, p. 4-2.
5̂Davenport, Value, p. 354.
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when we realize that Jevons channeled his thoughts on dis­
tribution in two separate directions; consequently two dis­
tinct theories emerge, the first treating consumer alloca­
tion and the second, distributive shares. The discursiveness 
with which he attacks these problems is occasionally con­
fusing to the reader and often obscures the originality of 
his thoughts. After treating consumer allocation, he 
passes directly to the exchange mechanism; further comment 
on distribution— as found in his discussion of labor and 
capital, for example— is therefore deferred until much 
later in the Theory.
Jevons would have done well to adopt Mill's method of 
presentation, treating production, distribution, and 
exchange in turn; here is a legacy which has been passed on 
to twentieth century analysis. For want of a better, more 
systematic method of presentation, the Theory sometimes 
suffers; in his readiness to criticize Mill at every oppor­
tunity Jevons seems blinded to the fact that Mill1s,Prin­
ciples is far superior to the Theory as regards organization 
and topical treatment of economic ideas. Schumpeter 
suggests:
...Perhaps he owed more to Mill than he knew; he 
harbored a strong aversion to Mill's Principles, 
which he had to use in his teaching'; but Mill's 
tergiversations, which are such excellent targets 
for rifle practice, may nevertheless have taught 
him many t h i n g s . 6
^Schumpeter, History, p. 826.
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Despite these organizational difficnlties, each of
Jevons' approaches to distribution represents a somewhat
original attempt to extend the marginal utility concept to
the realm of distribution. The reader will note that only
the first of these theories, as regards consumer allocation,
is treated here. It is the author’s opinion that Jevons'
other statements on distribution represent a departure from
the main themes of his value theory. Those who wish to
investigate this subject further should see Appendix B.
As is the ease with many of Jevons' concepts, his
theory of consumer allocation has an archetype; in this
instance it is Gossen's famous Second Law:
...In order to obtain the maximum sum of enjoy­
ment, an individual who has a choice between a 
number of enjoyments, but insufficient time to 
procure all completely, is obliged, however 
much the absolute amount of individual enjoy­
ments may differ, to procure all partially, even 
before he has completed the greatest of them.
The relation between them must be such that, at 
the, moment when they are discontinued, the 
amounts of all enjoyments are equal.7
In other words maximum utility will result from a uniform 
level of "want satisfaction." (So far as the author can 
ascertain, Jevons arrived at this concept quite indepen­
dently, and did not discover Gossen's Entwipklung until
8eight years after the Theory was first published.)
7'Gossen, Entwiekelung, p. 12. 
ftSee Jevons, Theory, p. xxxv. Nor was he aware that 
Bernouilli had given voice to substantially the same idea 
in his "Specimen Theoriae" as early as 1738» (See
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Reasoning from this principle, Jevons postulates two 
eases in which the concept will govern consumer allocation; 
the first treats/ the allocation of a single commodity among 
various uses; the second, the distribution of a commodity 
over time.
(1) Allocation Among Different Uses
By simple illustration Jevons shows how his "Law of
the Variation of the Final Degree of Utility" can be
extended to consumer allocation, given a single commodity
and various means for employing it. He offers the case of
an "isolated family" which possesses stock s of a commodity
capable of two distinct uses, x-̂ and ^  definition
x^ + = s_. Rational conduct will dictate that only the
distribution which affords greatest utility will be chosen;
at this point "...an increment of commodity (will) yield
9exactly as much utility in one use as in another." A-Hq 
and A  u  ̂are given to denote the increments of utility 
which arise from the consumption of one more unit of com­
modity in uses x-̂  and Xg, respectively. Thus, when the 
desired allocation is completed, A  u-̂ ought to exactly 
equal A  u .̂ To state it another way, at the point of max­
imum satisfaction the final degrees of utility in the two 
uses will be equal; at the limit the equation appears:
du-. = du5, 
dx dy
Schumpeter, History, p. 1055)* ^Jevons, Theory, p. 59.
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where x, y 9X6 equal to x-̂ , respectively. Ceteris par­
ibus , this same reasoning will apply to all uses simultane­
ously, with the result that all commodities, if consumed 
"rationally," will generate maximum utility. Only under 
the rarest circumstances— as in the event of the scarcity 
of such an essential grain as barley— would this principle 
prove inoperative; in such instances the utility of the 
grain as food might far exceed its utility in other uses, 
even, Jevons muses, in the production of "alcoholic 
liquors."
(2) Allocation of Commodity Over Dime
Jevons also directs his attention to a related alloca­
tion problem: given a single use for commodity, s, and n
days in which to consume it, how can this commodity be con­
sumed over time with the greatest utility? In this 
instance the condition for utility maximization would be 
written
Vi - v2 = v5 = ... - vn ,
where v^, v^, etc. denote the final degrees of utility on 
each day's consumption. Yet, suppose that the consumer is 
uncertain as to how long the stock of commodity will last; 
how will uncertainty condition his allocation? Jevons pro­
poses that his future pleasures or pains must be reduced in 
proportion to their want of certainty; letting ^  ••• En 
denote the successively diminishing fractions of uncer­
tainty— and again assuming consumer rationality— he obtains
-35-
the following maximization condition:
v lJ?l - y2^2 = • • = ^nPn •
...The general result is, that as the probability 
is less, the commodity assigned to each day is 
less, so that v., , its final degree of utility, will 
be greater.10
Similarly, the allocation must also account for the varying 
influence of an event according to its "propinquity or 
remoteness." Individuals tend to place greater value on 
present feelings rather than future feelings which are 
absolutely certain to occur. The above maximization condi­
tions must therefore be amended to include some "discount­
ing factor." Jevons designates these fractions of discount 
"by £2* * * * &n * new maxlmlza‘tl°n equation is
written
v l»l*l = r2?2*2 = *** = •
...It will be an obvious consequence of these 
equations that less commodity will be assigned 
to future days in some proportion to the inter­
vening time.11
This distribution problem is often faced by ships about to 
make a voyage of uncertain duration. Given the. proper wind 
conditions, the vessel might make passage in as little as 
ten days; at worst the voyage will extend to as many as 
thirty days. Were the ship's supply of food to be divided 
into thirty equal parts, partial starvation would develop 
during the first ten days— all this to ward off later evils
10Ibid., p. 72 i:Lrbid., p. 73.
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which might not even take place. Yet, consumption of one-
tenth of the food on each of the first ten days might even
he worse, for complete starvation would certainly ensue on
the eleventh day. The most beneficial distribution would
have to account for two factors: (1) the law of variation
of the degree of utility of food; and (2) the probability
of each day between the tenth and thirtieth days becoming
part of the voyage. Jevons suggests that
...the allotments to the first ten days should 
be equal. They should afterwards decrease 
according to some regular law; for, as the 
probability decreases, the final degree of util­
ity should increase in inverse p r o p o r t i o n . 12
********
While there is much to be said for Jevons' initial 
statement on the distribution process, it is disconcerting 
to find that he treats distribution only as regards the 
satisfaction of consumers' wants. For this reason marginal 
utility appears important only with regard to consumer 
goods and services; virtually nothing is said of the util­
ity attaching to the factor inputs used to create these 
goods and services. Schumpeter observes that others—  
Gossen and Walras are notable examples— were equally guilty 
of this error. Of all the Austrians only Menger
-...went on to say that means of production— or, 
as he called them, 'goods of higher order'—  
come within the concept of economic goods by 
virtue of the fact that they also yield
1 2 I b i d . , p .  ? 4 .
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consumers ' satisfaction, though only indirectly, 
through helping to produce things that do satisfy 
consumers' wants directly.13
Menger's generalization of this concept allows us to treat 
all factors, of production as "incomplete" consumable goods; 
the principle of marginal utility can thus be extended to 
include all areas of production and distribution. More 
than anything Jevons' failure to apply this principle to 
production theory represents a technical defect in his 
writings. One could easily argue that were it not for the 
exigency of readying his Theory for the press in such a 
short time, he might have attended to this defect; there 
can be no doubt that he had the necessary marginal tools 
for handling this. Yet, to impute any more than this to 
Jevons does discredit to Menger and later writers who car­
ried marginal analysis beyond the realm of consumption.
15̂Schumpeter, History, pp. 912-13 <>
CHAPTER IV
Marginal Utility and the Exchange Mechanism
- .. .The first problem that Jevons...tackled, by
means of the marginal utility apparatus was the 
■ problem of barter. Like (his) 'classic' prede-
 c-essors, (Jevons) realized the central position
of exchange value although, also like these pred­
ecessors, (he) did not make it sufficiently clear 
...that exchange value is but a special form of a 
universal coefficient of transformation on the 
derivation of which pivots the whole logic of 
economic phenomena.1.
Many would argue that at no point in his Theory does 
Jevons venture more than a few inches outside the framework 
of a static barter economy. In this sense his visions were 
similar to those of his intellectual predecessors. Yet 
others would defend Jevons as both progenitor and prophet 
of modern economic theory. His treatment of exchange 
serves as a good instrument for testing the mettle of this 
argument, for it is here that the heuristic significance of 
Jevonian theory is most evident: Jevons" "law of indiffer­
ence" was later translated into Edgeworth's famous
2"indifference-curve" approach to demand analysis; Walras 
used Jevons' marginal utility concept as a device for
■^Schumpeter, History, p. 911.
p Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics, pp. 28-29.
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*constructing the first general equilibrium systemy  even 
Marshall unwittingly drew on Jevons' utility theory, trans-
ILforming it into a doctrine of real cost. That these and 
other men used Jevons" discussion of the exchange mechanism 
as a critical springboard for their own deduction would 
indicate that, more than anything, the Theory of Political 
Economy was important heuristically.
Yet, the author does not mean to imply that Jevons"
treatment of exchange is without its faults; to the con-
  \trary, his errors are often painfully obvious. In the
first place Jevons lacks a general theory of the determin­
ation of prieeso^ At the outset he makes the wrong assump­
tion that the principles which govern two-party, two- 
commodity barter can be applied equally as well to perfectly 
competitive exchange. In making this assumption he fails 
to understand the connection between subjective utility 
estimation and the formation of market prices. For the 
most part he regards market prices as already "given" and
Leon Walras, Elements of Pure Economics (trans. 
William Jaffe), Homewood, 111., Richard D. Irwin, 1954, 
pp. 153-164.
ILSehumpeter, History, p. 1057*
5̂Robertson suggests that MacLeod, an economist who 
greatly influenced Jevons, actually surpassed Jevons in one 
respect: he went beyond value theory to consider the (more
relevant) theory of price determination; it is surprising 
that Jevons, a man who relied so heavily on the writings of 
MacLeod, therefore, did not also venture into price theory. 
See R. M. Robertson, "Jevons and His Precursors," Econo- 
metrica, XIX, 1951, pp. 237-238.
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is concerned with them only as they relate to marginal
utility when an equilibrium has been reached
A second major error in Jevons* treatment of exchange
is found in his misuse of mathematics. Admittedly, Jevons
7did not pretend to be a mathematician,' He viewed mathe­
matics as an important device for clarifying economic con­
cepts, as indeed it is. But his mathematical approach is 
often poorly handled. Schumpeter observes
...we must see (in Jevons* exchange theory) an 
embryonic theory of general equilibrium or, at 
all events, a particular form of the unifying 
principle that is at the bottom of any general- 
equilib-rium system. (But the reason he) did not
make it fully articulate (is because he) did not
understand the meaning of a set of simultaneous 
equations.. .8
The third major error which Jevons commits is to be 
found in the preface to the Theory* s chapter on exchange, 
in which he sets about defining certain pertinent economic 
terms: "markets,'* "trading bodies," and the "Law of Indif­
ference ."
His definition of the "market" is taken from Cournot
and Cantillon:
.o.By a market I shall mean two or more persons 
dealing in two or more commodities, whose stocks
6See Roll, History, pp. 380-381; also, Hans Mayer, 
'Der Erkenntniswert der funktionelien Preistheorien’, Die 
Wirtschaftstheorie der Gegenwart, Berlin, Prager, 1932,
pp. 181-182.
7rSee Jevons, Theory, pp. xiii-xiv.
OSchumpeter, History, p. 1057-
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of those commodities and intentions of exchang­
ing are known to all. It is also essential that 
the ratio of exchange between any two persons 
should be known to all others. It is only so 
far as this community of knowledge extends that 
the market extends.9
Hence, by definition, he excludes imperfectly competitive 
forces from the market altogether. Whether or not Jevons 
intended to treat these forces at a later date, when he 
would have been less pressed for time, is a matter of con­
jecture; his deflection from pure theory to statistical 
investigations (circa. 1872) would indicate that he did 
not propose to extend his analysis to imperfect competi­
tion. At any event, the generalized case of market imper­
fections was never formulated.
One might take even greater issue with Jevons’ defin­
itions of the "Law of Indifference'1 and "trading bodies." 
The former assumes perfect homogeniety of all commodities; 
that is to say, any portion of one commodity may be used in 
place of any equal portion of another. Since, ceteris par­
ibus , there can be no reason why persons would treat exactly 
similar things differently, all portions of a good must be 
exchanged at the same ratio in the same market simultane­
ously. In other words
...in the same open market, at any one moment, 
there cannot be two prices for the same kind of 
article...I propose to eall this The Law of 
Indifference, meaning that, when two objects or 
commodities are subject to no important
9Jevons, Theory, pp. 85-86.
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difference as regards the purpose in view, they 
will either of them he taken instead of the other 
with perfect indifference to the purchaser.10
Once more Jevons is postulating the case of a perfectly 
competitive market. Taken in this eontext, the Law of 
Indifference is a useful analytical device. Yet, in a 
"real world" sense, the concept is virtually useless. 
Jevons* error is in his assumption that real world and com­
petitive analysis were one and the same. Though he allows 
for such factors as defective credit of purchasers, their 
imperfect knowledge of the market, etc., these elements are 
considered to he extraneous to the market‘d  and therefore 
are excluded from the analysis. Robinson observes that 
this was a common error of most writers of the period; 
these economists
,..misled by the logical priority of perfect com­
petition in their scheme, were somehow trapped 
into thinking that it must be of equal importance 
in the real world. When they found in the real 
world some phenomena...which is inconsistent with 
the assumptions of perfect competition, they were 
inclined to look for some complicated explanation 
of it, before the simple explanation occurred to 
them that the real world did not fulfill the 
assumptions of perfect competition.12
Ibid., pp. 91-92. Jevons adds that, given these 
conditionss "...the ratio of exchange at any moment is 
that of dy to dx, of an infinitely small quantity of one 
commodity to the infinitely small quantity of another which 
is given for it" (ibid., p. 95).
■^Jevons proposes that such factors will produce 
"unnatural ratios of exchange" (ibid., p. 86).
12Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competi­
tion, London, MacMillan, 194-2, pp. 3-2f»
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This dichotomy was later realized by Edgeworth, Walras, 
Marshall, and Wicksell, who, with varying degrees of suc­
cess, attempted to place Jevons' Law of Indifference in a 
truer perspective.
Economists are in general agreement that Jevons’ def-
13inition of the "trading body" is, at best, clumsy. v It is
sketched in the broadest of terms as "...any body either of
buyers or sellers....either an individual or an aggregate
14of individuals..." who trade in the open market» Farmers 
are a trading body when they sell their produce to millers; 
millers are one when they sell flour to bakers; and so 
forth. Jevons looked on this concept as a natural out­
growth of the Law of Indifference: each trading body is
indifferent to choosing any single homogeneous commodity 
over an identical one with the result that a single price 
prevails. Each trading body has an effect on the market 
and, in turn, is affected by the market.
The present author cannot accept Jevons' trading body 
concept for at least two reasons. In the first place it 
completely obscures the distinction between barter and
13̂Young notes that if this concept "were taken in any 
literal sense the market could not be supposed to be com­
petitive. With all the millers and all the bakers in Eng­
land conceived rigidly as a single pair of traders, the 
'law of indifference' could not be invoked, and the equa­
tion of exchange would not lead to a determinate ratio of 
exchange" ("Jevons' Theory," p. 586). See also Eckard, 
Economics, p. 21; Roll, History, pp. 581-382.
14Jevons, Theory, pp. 88-89.
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competitive exchange. Are we to assume— as Jevons does 
time and again— that the very same conditions hold irre­
spective of the number of commodities or parties to 
15exchange? x So the concept would imply. Or can we accept 
Jevons' inference that the conditions of equilibrium are 
satisfied by a single price?"^ Again, decidedly not. We 
must agree with Hutchison, who suggests that Jevons appar­
ently
...intended to make one model cover both two-­
party and two-eommodity barter, and a competitive 
market in a monetary economy. As a result neither 
case gets clearly formulated.17
Even more inadmissible is Jevons8 implication that freely
competitive exchange leads to some sort of social welfare.
1ftmaximization. He infers that, since barter equilibrium 
gives rise to maximum satisfaction for two individuals, com­
petitive equilibrium will fulfill this condition for any 
number of parties. Ihis curious extention of Gossen's 
Second Law is a convenient device which Jevons uses to 
prove the universality of his exchange equations. But this 
device is both unnecessary and illogical.
It is to these and other points which we now turn.
~^See Knut Wicksell, Uber Wert, Kapital und Rente, 
London, London School of Economics Reprints, 1933» P« 48.
■^See Roll, History, p. 381.
17'Hutchison, Review, pp. 42-4-3.
■^See Roll, History, p. 385»
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(l) Simple Two-Party, Two-Commodity Exchange
........The keystone of the whole Theory of Exchange
and of the principle problems of Economics, lies 
in this proposition— the ratio of exchange of
.....any two commodities will be the reciprocal of the
ratio of the final degrees of - utility of the 
quantities of commodity available for consumption 
after the exchange is completed.T9
20As the most basic of all economic processes, exchange 
can assume many forms, the simplest of which involves two 
trading bodies exchanging two commodities. Trading body A 
will exchange some portion of his commodity for a certain 
portion of trading body B's commodity, with the result that 
a gain in utility is effected for both parties. The terms 
of the exchange will be defined by the respective utility 
functions of the two traders; for example, if ten pounds of 
corn are given for one of beef, this implies that the owner 
of corn considers ten pounds of his commodity to be less 
useful than one of beef. The same holds true for the owner 
of beef, as regards his commodity. The process of exchange 
will be terminated only after no further gain can be 
realized:
...This point of equilibrium will be known by the 
criterion, that an infinitely small amount of com­
modity exchanged in addition, at the same rate, 
will bring neither gain nor loss of utility.21
19Jevons, Theory, p. 95« See also Jevons' letter to 
Professor Walras (May 12, 1874) in Letters and Journal, 
pp. 502-304.
20See Jevons, Theory, p. 75*
21Ibid., p. 96.
Jevons utilizes a diagram to show the process by which this 
equilibrium is reached:
FIGURE II
m.
In Figure II the curve pqr represents a small portion of 
the utility function for commodity A, while the broken 
curve, p 8qr*, is a similar curve for commodity Bo This lat­
ter curve has been reversed and superimposed on the former 
one so that, while quantities of commodity A are measured 
from point a to point b, the quantities of commodity B are 
measured from b to a. Assuming units of both commodities 
to be represented by equal lengths, we see that line aa1 
represents an increase of commodity A, but a decrease of 
commodity B*
For the sake of simplicity Jevons proposes that the 
ratio of exchange is 1:1, so that, for example, by receiv- 
ing commodity a'a a person gains utility ad, and loses 
utility ale; hence, the net gain in utility is cd and the
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individual will wish, to extend the exchangee But how far?
Jevons asks. Were this individual to continue it as far as
point bj_, and he were still proceeding, through the next
small exchange he would receive utility he. But in so
doing he loses utility b 1f, which implies a net loss of ef.
Obviously he has gone too far, and should have discontinued
the exchange at point £, the point of greatest advantage or
"maximum utility." Beyond this equilibrium point net gain
becomes net loss, with disutility as a result.
Jevons demonstrates how this first case of exchange
22might be translated into a simple "calculus." He reverts 
to the notations which were used in his treatment of dis­
tribution; that is, 6 x represents a small increment of 
one commodity (corn) and Ay , a small increment of another 
commodity (beef) given for it. If both are homogeneous 
commodities, the Law of Indifference will prevail: ^ y
will be to A x as y, the whole quantity of beef, is to x,
the whole quantity of corn; or
A L  = _ X _  •
A X  X
23Jevons then incorrectly  ̂assumes that by multiplying each 
22"Jevons calls his mathematical processes calculus, 
but they correspond to the processes now taught in algebra"
(Eckard, Economics, p. 18).
23Eckard questions Jevons" mathematical reasoning:
"The expression a y = y discloses the relationship, ade-
A X  X
quately, but when he multiplies each side of the equation
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side of the equation by A  x , he is able to obtain a sim­
ilar relationship:
^ 7  = J L A  x *x
■   r  '
This equation would imply that A y , the increment of beef,
is y times as great as A x , the increment of corn;, then, 
x
for their utilities to be equal, the degree of utility of
beef must be x times as great as the degree of utility of
1
corn:
o o uThus we arrive at the principle that the 
degrees of utility of commodities exchanged will 
be in the inverse proportion of the magnitudes
of the increments exchanged0
Exchange will alter both the holdings of commodity and 
the degrees of utility of the exchanging parties <> Suppose 
that the total quantity of corn is a and the total quantity 
of beef, b. In the process of exchange x of corn is given 
for 2 °f beef; after it is terminated the eorn owner holds 
a - x of corn and y of beef, while the beef-owner holds x 
of corn and b - y of bee.f0 The utility functions may be 
designated as follows:
0^(4 - x) = final degree of utility of corn to the 
eorn-owner;
by A  x.»ohe destroys the relationship between a  x and a y. 
This operation can be carried on, correctly, only with num­
bers, which is to say, abstract ideasc An increment of corn 
cannot be multiplied by a relationship between a quantity of 
corn and a quantity of beef!" (ibido, p. 23)°
24Jevons, Theory, p. 100„
-4-9-
0 2X = final degree of utility of eorn to the beef-
owner;
= final degree of utility of beef to the eorn- 
owner;
2^  ~ 7") = final degree of utility of beef to the 
beef-owner.
•Therefore, the corn-owner will not be satisfied until the 
following equilibrium condition is fulfilled:
Assuming, as before, that dy = y , Jevons substitutes
dx x
for the second member of this equation, and obtains an 
equation which represents the equilibrium condition which 
faces the owner of corn:
Pari passu, what holds true for the corn-owner must like­
wise hold true for the beef-owner:
0 -ĵCa - x) ’ dx = ° dy; or
0 1(a - x) = dy .
y  iy
^ 2^  “ y) ° dy = <j>2* ° dxV;
or, by substitution:
0  2* = _z_ •x
...We arrive, then, at the conclusion, that when­
ever two commodities are exchanged for each other, 
and more or less can be given or received in 
infinitely small quantities, the quantities
exchanged satisfy two equations, which may he thus 
stated in a concise form—
0 x(a - y) = _2_ = 0  2x .25
y q y  x J)
Jevons proposes that these two equations alone are suffi­
cient to determine the results of all forms of perfectly 
competitive exchange: it is simply a matter-of solving for
the "unknowns," in this case, x and y, the amounts supplied 
and demanded. The important notion that conditions of 
exchange might he represented hy simultaneous equations 
dates back as early as Mill:
...the idea of a ratio, as between demand and sup­
ply, is out of place, and has no concern in the 
matter: the proper mathematical analogy is that
of an equation. Demand and supply, the quantity 
demanded and the quantity supplied, will he made 
equal. If unequal at any moment, competition 
equalizes them, and the manner in which this is 
done is by an adjustment of the value.27
Jevons credits Mill with having first noticed this, while
25Ibid. In his discussion of Jevons' final equations 
of exchange, Roll notes that "he nowhere explained how 
these collective marginal utilities were determined. In 
fact, what he was considering was a case of isolated 
exchange, in which it is now admitted that the actual ratio 
of exchange is indeterminate within certain limits. It was 
left to Walras and others to show the connection between 
marginal utility, demand, and price under competitive con­
ditions" (Roll, History, p. 382).
26Stigler observes that "quite aside from the ambig­
uous concept of the trading body, this procedure was 
illicit on (Jevons1) own view that utilities of different 
individuals are not comparable" (Stigler, "Utility Theory," 
p .  3 1 9 ) .
2^Mill, Principles, p. 448.
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at the same time criticizing him for not having shown how, 
given a discrepancy between supply and demand, they are 
ultimately brought into equilibrium. Another flaw in 
Mill's reasoning is his implication that exchange condi­
tions ean be stated in a single equation, when, in actual­
ity, at least two equations are requisite. The symbol x in. 
Jevons1 final exchange equations (above) represents quan­
tity demanded on one side and quantity supplied on the 
other; and similarly for symbol y. If these two equations 
are simultaneously true, according to Jevons, then..„the x 
and y of one equation will equal those of the other and 
the equilibrium exchange condition will be met. "...The 
laws of supply and demand are thus a result of...the true
p otheory of value or exchange."
(2) Exchange Between Two Trading Bodies of Unequal Size
The implicit assumption that all trading bodies are of 
equal size is unnecessary; indeed, if exchange analysis is 
to approach real world conditions, this assumption must be 
discarded. So long as commodities are capable of infinite
pQJevons, Theory, p. 101. At this point Jevons 
appears to come closest to understanding the true relation­
ship between supply and demand, and their equality in equi­
librium. This implication is again made in Appendix V of 
the Theory when he admits having employed "intersecting 
(supply and demand) eurves to illustrate the determination 
of the market price in...lectures at Owens College (1863)." 
(Ibid., p. 333) Why Jevons did not include such diagrams 
in the Theory cannot be ascertained. Recent correspondence 
with the British Museum indicates that the 1863 lectures 
have not been preserved (see Appendix C, p. 118).
subdivision, the basie principles of exchange remain the 
same::
...We may, firstly, express the conditions of a 
great market where vast quantities of some stock 
are available, so that any one small trader will 
not appreciably affect the ratio of exchange.
This ratio is, then, approximately a fixed num­
ber, and each trader exchanges at that ratio just 
so much as suits him.29
Let A be the trading body possessing two very large stocks 
of commodities, a and b. The other trading body, C, holds 
a comparatively small quantity, c, of the second commodity 
and exchanges a portion of it, y--which is very small com­
pared with b—  for portion x of a— which is very small com­
pared with a. When the exchange is completed A will hold 
quantities a - x and b + y ; conversely, C will hold x and 
c - y. This is shown by the equation:
01>  ~ “ I  ~ <t> 2X .
+ y) x -y-2(c - y)
Assuming that a - x and b + y are roughly equivalent to a 
and b, respectively, it is possible to substitute the lat­
ter quantities and obtain the equation:
0  j a  =  y  »  m  , 
yrib ~
where m is given as the existing ratio of exchange.
Under these circumstances the ratio of exchange is
29Ibid., p. 112. In terms of modern theory Jevons is 
postulating the case of an individual firm in a perfectly 
competitive industry.
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determined by the conditions facing trading body A and is 
comparatively fixed. Therefore, only one unknown quantity, 
x, must be solved for; this quantity will be purchased by 
C in exchange for some portion of The actual amount of 
c which is given in exchange will be determined by the 
equation: ^
$  la = <t> 2X .
\jj-.Lb y 2(c - mx)
An even simpler exchange equation can be given to rep­
resent most of a consumer's daily purchases. Generally 
speaking, an individual will desire so little of a given 
commodity, such as salt, that he will give up only a small 
percentage of his possessions in order to obtain it. Sup­
pose that y (i*1 the above equation) represents only a very 
small part of c. In this case ojf2 ê ~ ^  will roughly
express the conditions of exchange:
0 2X - 
'Vr2C
or 0  2X = 1 ° 'Vr2e°
Trading body C’s exchange pattern will follow this general 
law: he will purchase the commodity until its degree of
7)0
^ "This equation represents the position of an indi­
vidual consumer with regard to the aggregate trade of a 
large community, since he must buy at the current prices, 
which he cannot in an appreciable degree effect." Ibid., 
p. 115.
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utility falls below that of the commodity which he must 
give up:
...in the above equation m represents the
utility to him of a penny, which being an incon­
siderable fraction of his possessions, is approx­
imately invariable in utility, and he buys salt 
until 02x» which is approximately the utility of
the next pound, is equal to, or it may be some­
what less than that of the penny.31
However the same reasoning cannot be applied to the case of 
those purchases which form a large part of an individual's 
total consumption. This is especially true in the case of 
a poor family which is about to purchase a significant com­
modity such as meat. Only after they have secured a suffi­
cient quantity of meat will the final degree of utility of 
this commodity begin to diminish:
...The more they buy, the lower the final degree 
of utility of the meat, and the higher the final 
degree of utility of something else; and thus 
these purchases will be the more narrowly 
limited.32
(3) Multi-Commodity Exchange Among Numerous Trading Bodies 
An unfortunate assumption which Jevons makes is that 
the same principles which govern barter can be applied with 
equal facility to multi-commodity exchange among any number 
of competing parties:
1̂Ibid., p. 114. Jevons implies the demand for salt 
is less than perfectly elastic within a narrowly defined 
range below the market price.
52Ibid.
...Exactly the same principles hold true, however 
numerous and complicated may be the conditions.
T h e  m a i n  p o i n t  t o  b e  r e m e m b e r e d  i n  t r a c i n g  o u t  
t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  t h e o r y  i s ,  t h a t  t h e  s a m e  p a i r  
o f  c o m m o d i t i e s  i n  t h e  s a m e  m a r k e t  c a n  h a v e  o n l y  
o n e  r a t i o  o f  e x c h a n g e . . .  3 3
A n  e x p l i c i t  a s s u m p t i o n  b e h i n d  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  i s  t h a t  t r a n s ­
p o r t  c o s t s  a r e  n o n - e x i s t e n t .  T h e  m o r e  n u m e r o u s  t h e  t r a d i n g  
b o d i e s  a n d  c o m m o d i t i e s  b e c o m e ,  t h e  m o r e  e q u a t i o n s  w i l l  b e  
n e e d e d  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  e x c h a n g e  p r o c e s s .  T h e  s i m p l e s t  
e x a m p l e  o f  t h i s  t y p e  o f  e x c h a n g e  w o u l d  i n v o l v e  t h r e e  c o m ­
m o d i t i e s  a n d  t h r e e  t r a d i n g  b o d i e s ,  w h i c h  f a c e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s :
A  p o s s e s s e s  t h e  s t o c k  a  o f  c o t t o n . ,  a n d  g i v e s  x, 
o f  i t  t o  B ,  x 2 t o  C .
B  p o s s e s s e s  t h e  s t o c k  b  o f  s i l k ,  a n d  g i v e s  y ^
o f  i t  t o  A ,  t o  2.°
C  p o s s e s s e s  t h e  s t o c k  c  o f  w o o l ,  a n d  g i v e s  z.
o f  i t  t o  A ,  Z £  t o  B „  34-
S o l u t i o n  o f  t h i s  e x c h a n g e  p r o b l e m  w i l l  i n v o l v e  s i x  u n k n o w n  
q u a n t i t i e s — x-^, y ^ ,  z ^ ,  X £ ,  ^ 2 *  Tlie 0;f e x c h a n g e
i s  s t a t e d :
A  g i v e s  x ^  f o r  y ^ ,  a n d  x ^  f o r  z ^ .
B  g i v e s  y ^  f o r  x ^ ,  a n d  ^  ^ o r  ^ 2 *
C  g i v e s  f o r  x ^ ,  a n d  f o r  y £ „  ^
N o t a t i o n  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  u t i l i t y  i s  s h o w n  a s :
, q//~ , -y ; t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  u t i l -  
1 r 1 1 i t y  f o r  A .
5 5 I b i d . ,  p p .  1 1 4 - 1 1 5 .  
5 5 I b i d .
54Ibid., p. 115.
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o ■̂tle respective functions of util-
r  * A d ity for B.
(h-£i '\l/'-Ai "Yt, : the respective functions of util-
r  y Y ?  y ity for C.36
When exchange is completed A will hold the quantity 
a - x1 - x2 of cotton and y^ of silk; B, in turn, will pos­
sess x-̂  of cotton and b - - y2 °f silk. The actual
ratio of exchange is y^ for x^, and will be determined by a 
pair of equations:
1—1 M11 —1 - x2) = I 1 = <P 2X1
I7! X1 l/r 2(b - *1 " 12)
Other equations will apply to the exchanges between A
<b - xi - x2) = Z1 = 4> Jx2
X  izi x2 X  3<-c - zi - z2)
And similarly for interchange between B and C.
ijr 2^  " 7i - j2 y  = z2 “ y r 5y2
H  2Z2 ^2 1i—1
N1Oroi Zg.)
Even the most complex exchanges may be decomposed into these 
simple eases, Jevons argues. It is merely a matter of con­
sidering every exchange as a process which gives rise to 
two equations, and solving for the quantities involved. 
Underlying this analysis is the assumption that all commod­
ities are infinitely divisible; the condition of indivisi­
bility is treated later in Jevons’ Theory as one of several 
impediments to exchange.
56rbid., p. 116.
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(-4) Competition in Exchange: 3 Trading Bodies
...One case of the Theory of Exchange is of consid­
erable importance, and arises when two parties com­
pete together in supplying a third party with a 
certain commodity.37
Imagine a situation in which trading body A, again in 
possession of quantity a of his commodity, is willing to 
exchange a portion of it for another commodity which both B 
and C possess; in amounts b and c, respectively. Suppose 
that A gives up x-̂ of his stock, a, to B, and x2 to G. In 
exchange A will receive of b (from B), and y2 £
(from C)» Assuming perfect homogeniety of commodity, we 
obtain a single ratio of exchange, based on the Law of 
Indifference:
yl = J 2 0 (1)
x2 x2
So long as he receives the right commodity in the right 
amounts, trading body A will be indifferent as to its 
source. All he cares about is that he receives y-̂  + y2
in return for surrendering + x2 . Therefore:
yl + y2 = _£l_ .
X1 + x2 X1
A will terminate the exchange only when the ratio of the 
final degrees of utility of the two commodities (a, and 
b,c) exactly equate the reciprocal of the ratio of exchange, 
as stated above:
^ Ibid., p. 117«
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<t> l(a - ?X - x2> - ■ (2)
+ *2> X1
The same principle must also hold for both B and C:
0 2X1 " JV; (3)
'xfrẑ0 - ̂  xi
(j) 3X2 y2 . (4-)
” 3̂ 2̂  x2
A solution of these four equations would involve determina­
tion of the values of the four unknowns, x^, x^, y-p J2 ■
(5) Impediments to Exchange: Transport Costs
The problem of formulating the principles of exchange 
is made no less difficult by the existence of certain ele­
ments which act to impede the exchange process. Included 
in these ’’impediments to exchange" are such factors as
transport costs, charges of brokers, agents, packers, etc.,
/and customs duties. All these charges and more will tend 
to reduce the advantages of commerce in this respect: such
costs will usually be proportional to the quantity of com­
modity, and, if expressed in money, can be considered as 
some part of the commodity which must be subtracted if 
exchange is to occur; trading bodies will therefore have 
less commodity at their disposal. Thus, if trading body A 
gives trading body B commodity x, the latter receives only 
part of this commodity, mx; the actual quantity of commod­
ity he receives will depend upon the fraction, m, which 
represents transport costs. B will terminate the exchange
only when
<j) 2 ( iax)
I X
Similarly, A will receive only ny in exchange, where n 
denotes the charges applied to y. In equilibrium
The existence of transport charges will require that two 
ratios of exchange be established; the greater the discrep­
ancy between these ratios, the less advantage there will be 
to exchange.
(6) Equivalence of Commodities
A special case of exchange will develop whenever two
different commodities are applicable to the same uses:
consumers of meats such as beef and mutton often appear
almost indifferent to choosing one over another, with the
result that their mutual ratio of exchange is practically
invariable. Such commodities, to use Jevons* phrasing,
are "more or less" reciprocally substitutable and the
degree of substitutability will depend upon each good's
f i n a l  d e g r e e  o f  u t i l i t y .  I n  1 8 ? 1  t h e  m u t t o n - b e e f  r a t i o  w a s
approximately 9 to 8, which would indicate that, while
these commodities were nearly substitutable, people tended
to place a slightly higher valuation on mutton:
...It follows that (if) the final degrees of 
utility of these meats are in this ratio, or 
that if (f) x be the degree of utility of mutton
X
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and 'ijfj that of beef, we have
8 - * 0  x . 9 ‘o/ry.58
This then is the condition for the optimum allocation of 
consumer expenditures; in seeking to maximize his util­
ity, a consumer will equate the ratio of the marginal util­
ities of the two goods with the ratio of their respective
3 9prices.
Jevons was aware that under "rare" circumstances this 
equation would not fulfill the conditions for utility maxi­
mization:
oo.if mutton became comparatively scarce, there 
would probably be some persons willing to pay a 
higher price merely because it would then be 
considered a delicacy.40
The ultimate result of such conditions would be that the
discrepancy between the prices of mutton and beef would
■ lbi'd., p. 135. Stigler observes that Jevons, m  
defining "substitutes" in terms of the constancy of the 
ratio of their marginal utilities, "was inconsistent, for 
he treated the marginal utility of X-̂ as dependent only on
the quantity of X^ in his general theory, whereas X^ and X^ 
are "equivalent," the marginal utility of X-̂ depends also 
on the quantity of X O n e  cannot define the usual rela­
tionships among the utilities of commodities with an addi­
tive utility function.00" (Stigler, "Utility Theory," p.384).
XQ
^ This differs from the modern optimum allocation 
position in an important respect: whereas Jevons speaks of
equating price ratios with utility ratios, the present-day 
economist avoids the utility concept and is more concerned 
with the relative preferences of consumers. This would 
require that price ratios be equated with the marginal 
rate of substitution of commodities, i.e., the quantity of 
one good which would ^ust compensate a consumer for the 
loss of a marginal -unit of another good. See Appendix A, 
p. 103.
40Jevons, Theory, p. 135»
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become even greater and, strictly speaking, these goods
could no longer be regarded as near-perfect substitutes.
However, he adds, this must be regarded as an extreme case.
The more general rule is that
...the conditions of supply will have no effect 
upon the ratio of exchange; we must, in fact, 
treat beef and mutton as one commodity of two 
different strengths, just as gold at eighteen 
and gold at twenty carats are hardly considered 
as two but rather as one commodity.̂ 1
( 7 )  E x c h a n g e  I n d e t e r m i n a c y
Jevons* faith in the efficacy of his exchange equa­
tions is unyielding only to a point; in a somewhat discur­
sive section of the Theory— entitled “Failure of the Equa­
tions of Exchange"— he admits that, owing to various 
parametric shifts in the conditions of exchange, it is 
possible to show several cases in which the exchange equa­
tions are inoperative. In the first place he postulates a 
case in which the utility functions of two trading bodies 
are so dissimilar as to preclude the existence of any 
trade at all:
41Ibid. Eckard observes that this statement is 
inconsistent with Jevons* principle of diminishing util­
ity: "If the supply of beef fell off, people could only
get more mutton by paying a higher price, unless the sup­
ply of mutton were perfectly elastic at the existing 
price. Hence, the conditions of supply do affect the 
ratios of exchange; for if mutton is produced under 
increasing cost, a higher price must be paid to call 
forth an additional quantity" (Economics. p. 24). Only 
under certain rarefied conditions.would the ratios of 
exchange of two substitutes remain the same, although
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may happen that the commodity possessed by 
A has a high degree of utility to A, and a low 
degree to B, and that vice versa B's commodity 
has a high degree of utility to B and less to A . ^2
Jevons maintains that, given these conditions, even though
B receives a very small amount of A's commodity, the final
degree of utility of this increment to him will be less
than that attaching to his own commodity. Exchange will
then benefit neither party and solution to the equations of
exchange is indeterminate.
Conversely, under different circumstances A may
exchange its entire commodity with B (and vice versa) and
still the equations may fail:
...A may have so low a desire for consuming his 
own commodity, that the very last increment of 
it has less degree of utility to him than a small
addition to the commodity received in exchange .̂ 3
In this instance each trading body desires the last incre­
ment of the good received more than it desires the last
increment given; a determinate solution is again impossible.
Another parametric change occurs when Jevons drops his 
initial assumption that all commodities are subject to
Jevons fails to realize this.
Perhaps it is a minor point, but the author would also 
take issue with Jevons9 analogy in the above statement: 
eighteen carat gold is easily converted into twenty carat 
gold, whereas such transformation is obviously impossible 
in the ease of mutton and beef.
42Jevons, Theory, p.-H9o
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infinite divisibility. This is obviously a more realistic
assumption, especially as regards such discrete items of
exchange as buildings and equipment. In the first place
he postulates the case of two parties, each of which is in
the possession of a single indivisible commodity, as, for
instance, a book. They are confronted with the problem of
•   - • )
exchanging the whole commodities or doing without exchange
completely. In this instance it is total utility, rather 
than final degree of utility, which is significant. Desig­
nating total utilities in the following way
u-̂ = the utility of A's book to A,
u2 = " " A's " to B,
= " " " B's " to A,
A| ! \v2 = " " ° B’s " to B,
Jevons concludes that exchange will occur only if 
(1) v-̂ > u^ and (2) u2 > v2 . y
Should one or both of these conditions not be fulfilled, 
there would be no reason for exchange to take place.
More complex problems can arise when an indivisible 
commodity if offered for one which is perfectly divisible; 
a good example of this situation is found in the case of 
Russia's sale of Alaska, an indivisible "commodity,'1 for 
American dollars, a divisible "commodity." In this
iLlLIbid., p. 121. 
^Ibid.
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instance the problem is determinate only within certain 
defined limits.
Another case could develop— and frequently does in 
retail trade— in which commodities are divisible, but insuf­
ficiently so. Commodities such as paper and wine are com­
monly produced in convenient, though discrete, units; to 
subdivide these units is to destroy the commodity com­
pletely. This problem would face a person buying ink. He 
must always weigh the total utility of a single bottle
against the total utility of the shilling he gives for it,
46as illustrated in Figure III:
Y  t
FIGURE III
x X
In the above diagram the total utilities attaching to suc­
cessive bottles of ink are shown by the spaees 
P2Uj» etc., whereas total utilities of successive shillings 
are Or^, P]^, etc. Obviously, the individual will purchase 
no more than three bottles; were he to purchase the fourth
^6Ibid., p. 126.
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bottle the individual would make the disadvantageous sacri­
fice of shilling p^r^r^p^. So again the equations of 
exchange prove operative only within a reasonably well- 
defined area.
Once having formulated these eases, Jevons emphati­
cally cautions the reader against accepting commodity indi­
visibility as the more general case. It is his contention 
that in practically all business dealings— especially in 
the area of international trade between great industrial 
nations— more or less commodity might be obtained in infi­
nitely small quantities.
(8) Footnotes to Exchange; The "True1 Origin of Value
As an architect of utilitarian economics Jevons is
always quick to criticize what he viewed as imperfections
in the basic framework of the science. However discursive
his writings may appear at times, there can be no doubt
that they reflect, above all, an attempt to smash the
Classical labor theory idol.
Almost an entire century had passed since Adam Smith,
the acknowledged progenitor of Classical economics, had
spelled out the role of labor-cost in the determination of
value. The wealth of nations, he proposed, is occasioned
...first, by the skill, dexterity, and judgment 
with which (a country's) labour is generally 
applied; and, secondly, by the proportion 
between the number of those who are employed in
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use ful labour, and that of those who are not so 
employed.^
Using Smith's theory as a point of departure, virtually
every economist during the early part of the nineteenth 
century set about discovering the "true" origins of value. 
In his Principles of Political Economy (1820) Malthus 
defined value in terms of the "amount of stored and cur­
rent labor" and utilized this definition to develop the
4-8concept of effective demand. Torrens extended the labor
theory to include capital, which he considered a type of
4-9"accumulated labor." J Similar statements were given by
47'Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of NationsT New York, Modern Library, 1937$ 
p . lvii.
48"It is obvious...that in the same place, and at the 
same time, the different quantities of day labour which 
different commodities can command, will be exactly in pro­
portion to their relative values in exchange; and if any 
two of them will purchase the same quantity of labour of 
the same description, they will invariably exchange with 
each other" (Thomas Malthus, Principles of Political Econ- 
omy, New York, A. M. Kelley, 1951$ P° 94)»
49"Thus, from the perpetually operating law of com­
petition. ..it inevitably follows, that after the community 
divides itself into a class of capitalists and a class of 
labourers, the results obtained by the employment of 
equivalent capitals or equal quantities of accumulated 
labour, will be equal in exchangeable value" (Robert Tor­
rens, Essay on the Production of Wealth, London, Longmans, 
1821, p. 63). The concept of "accumulated labour" was not 
wholly original with Torrens and can be traced to Smith, 
who made implicit references to it in his discussion of 
productive vs. unproductive labor; see Smith, Wealth,
pp. 194-195•
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50 51his contemporaries, James Mill and McCulloch, and do
not need to be repeated here. Perhaps the most controver­
sial variation on the labor theory belongs to Marx, whose
"surplus value" concept forms the cornerstone of his famous 
52Dialectic. The important point is that each of these
writers sought to explain value in terms of the labor
involved in the production of a given commodity, rather
than the subjective valuations which individuals place upon
a commodity. This is not to imply, however, that these men
wholly rejected the subjective-utility element. Ricardo
and J. S. Mill, two of the foremost exponents of the labor
theory, suggest that, while utility cannot be used as a
measure of value, it is nevertheless essential to value:
...possessing utility, commodities derive their 
exchangeable value from two sources: from
their scarcity, and from the quantity of labour 
required to obtain them.55
Ricardo implies that the first source is of somewhat lesser
importance than the second: there are only a few
50 ̂See James Mill's Elements of Political Economy, 
London, Longmans, 1821, pT
■̂̂ See J. R. McCulloch' s Principles of Political Econ­
omy, Edinburgh, A. & C. Black, 1849, pp. 572-575-
Surplus-value is produced by the employment of 
labour power. Capital buys the labour power and pays wages 
for it. By means of his work the labourer creates new 
value which does not belong to him, but to the capitalist" 
(Earl Marx, Capital, New fork, Modern Library, 1952, 
p. 59)»
^David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation, New York, MacMillan Company, 1921, p. 2.
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commodities
o..the value of which is determined by their 
scarcity alone. No labour can increase the quan­
tity of such goods (as rare statues and pictures), 
and therefore their value cannot be lowered by an 
increased supply.5^
The more general case is that labor, both "current" and
55"stored up," will determine value. ^
56It was upon the basis of this apparent discrepancy^ 
that Jevons built his case against Classical value theory: 
value cannot at one time be attributed to one cause and,
54Ibid.
55^Ricardo, unlike many of his contemporaries, realized 
that labor itself was subject to variation. This required 
a modification of his earlier hypothesis that value was 
exactly proportional to the amount of labor embodied in the 
production of a given commodity. At first glance this mod­
ification appears tautological: one wonders how it is pos­
sible that labor, as the single most important cause of 
value, is itself amenable to unequal valuation. Eric Roll 
suggests that Ricardo's modification is a legitimate one: 
"Value remains determined by current and stored-up labour 
whether the latter belongs to the labourer or not. The 
only difference is that in the latter case the value of the 
product which is appropriated by the capitalist is divided 
into two parts, one which pays the wages of the labourer, 
the other which is the capitalist's profit" (Roll, History, 
pp. 178-179)o See also George Stigler, "Ricardo and the 
93% Labor Theory of Value," American Economic Review, 
XLVIII, June, 1958.
56There can be no doubt that Jevons' interpretation of 
Classical theory was often incorrect. At one point in his 
work, for example, he chides Ricardo for his implication 
that all labor is of uniform quality./# (This was an incor­
rect interpretation of Ricardo, as noted earlier.) Jevons 
concludes that it is
...impossible to compare a priori the productive 
powers of a nawy, a carpenter, an iron puddler, 
a school master, and a barrister (Jevons,
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at other times, to another;
...The mere fact that there are many things, such 
as rare ancient books...which have high values, 
and which are absolutely incapable of production 
now, disperses the notion that value depends upon 
labour. Even those things which are producible 
in any quantity by labour seldom exchange exactly 
at the corresponding values.5?
By way of illustration Jevons cites the case of the (then) 
recently-completed Great Western Railway, the production 
of which required the services of a vast quantity of 
laborers. The value attaching to. such a project cannot 
depend, however, upon the quantity of labor employed, but 
rather upon the number of persons who find the railway use­
ful. Jevons felt that with the passage of time fewer and 
fewer people would find it useful and the total utility of 
the railway would eventually sink to zero. On the other 
hand an undertaking such as the Atlantic Cable could have a 
value far exceeding the amount of labor expended on it, at 
least for a time. It is therefore impossible to define 
value in terms of labor cost:
•° °labour once spent has no influence on the 
future value of any article; it is gone and
Theory, p. 166).
Given this assumption, Jevons proposes that the value of 
labor must ultimately be determined by the value of the 
produce, rather than vice versa. In other words, contrary 
to earlier statements by Ricardo and Mill, the value of 
labor is price-determined. (Eckard notes the parallelism 
between the above statement by Jevons and Gairnes* theory 
of reciprocal demand. See Eckard, Economies, p. 35*)
57Jevons, Theory, p. 163 •
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lq,st forever. In commerce “bygones are for ever 
bygones; and we are always starting clear at each 
moment, judging the values of things with a view 
of'future utility.58
Yet the labor element must not be discounted entirely;
though never the cause of value, labor is indirectly the
determining factor in many instances:
...Value depends solely on the final degree of 
utility. How can we vary this degree of util­
ity?— By having more or less of the commodity to 
consume. And how shall we get more or less of 
it?— By spending more or less labour in obtain­
ing a supply.59
lo summarize Jevons presents the famous value catena:
...Cost of production determines supply;
Supply determines final degree of utility:
Final degree of utility determines value.80
Ihe end result is that value depends upon the conditions of
demand in relation to a given supply; in this respect
Jevons® position is antithetical to the position of those
Classicists who treated changes in supply relative to a
fixed demand.
As will be demonstrated in PART II, Jevons® value
chain, with its simple causal relationships, is, like many
of Jevons' statements on value and exchange, incorrect; but
it is defective more in technique than in substance. It
58lbid., p. 164.
59Ibid., p. 165o
8QIbid. It was this statement which prompted Keynes 
to comment that Jevons "chiselled in stone where Marshall 
knits in wool" (Keynes, Essays, p. 144).
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remained for Alfred Marshall to pick away at the splinters 
of technical error which Jevons had unintentionally left in 
an -unfinished building.
PART II
MARSHALLIAN CRITICISM
Jevons saw the kettle boil and cried out with 
the delighted voice of a child; Marshall too 
had seen the kettle boil and sat down silently 
to build an engine„
John Maynard Keynes
CHAPTER V
The Marshallian Compromise
0 ooThere are few writers of modern times who 
have approached as near to the brilliant origin­
ality of Ricardo as Jevons has done0 But he 
appears to have judged both Ricardo and Mill 
harshly, and to have attributed to them doc­
trines narrower and less scientific than those 
which they really heldcl
Having already displayed the implements of devonian 
marginal utility analysis, we must now demonstrate the man­
ner in which Jevons’ major contemporary critic, Alfred
2Marshall, tested their mettle„ Of the many channels into 
which Marshall siphoned his assessments of the Jevonian 
theory, four were stressed and will concern us here:
(1) Marshall's proposition that while English "classical1 
thought was defective in a number of aspects, its major
"̂ Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, London, 
MacMillan & Co„, 1898, p» ^66a
2Marshall wins the title of Jevons' "major critic" by 
default: just as he had no major pupils, Jevons likewise
had no major critics (i.e„, reviewers), in the same sense 
as Mill was the great critic of Ricardo, Marshall of Mill, 
and Keynes of Marshall„ The first of Marshall's criti­
cisms of Jevons appeared as a review of the Theory of 
Political Economy in Academy, April 1, 1872<> (See reprint 
in Memorials of Alfred Marshall, A. Go Pigou, ed», Hew 
York, Kelley and Millman, 1956, ppc 93“100o) Brief refer­
ences to Jevons' work also were given in Marshall's Eco­
nomics of Industry, London, MacMillan & Co», 1901,
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tenets were fundamentally correct and heuristically signif 
icant; (2) his contention that Jevonian criticisms of 
classical analysis were to a large extent an outgrowth of 
misreading of the older doctrine; (3) his remonstrance 
against Jevons for overemphasizing demand forces without 
regard for the equally significant elements of real cost 
and supply; and (4) the perfunctory commendation which he 
accorded to Jevons for having polished the utility side of
3the value coin*
Schooled in the classical tradition, Marshall dis­
played a profound disregard for the iconoclasm of Jevons 
and the Austrian School in his early years* At the age of 
thirty he was asked hy the editors of Academy to review 
Jevons" Theory:
oooMy youthful loyalty to (Ricardo) boiled over 
when I read Jevons9 Theory*,»,1 have a vivid mem­
ory of the angry phrases which would force them­
selves into my draft (of the review), only to be 
cut out and then reappear in another form a lit­
tle later on, and then to be cut out again.^
pp* 185, 242; Money Credit and Commerce, London, MacMillan 
& Co., 1924, pp* 20, 29, 279-280* The only "extended" 
criticism appears in Marshall's Principles', especially
pp* 566-570*
^See Schumpeter, History, pp* 920-922*
4Memorials, p. 100* There were three other major 
reviews of the Theory; by John Elliot Cairnes in the 
Fortnightly Review, Simon Newcomb in the North American 
Review, and an anonymous writer in the Saturday Review.
All differ in tone: only Cairnes0 and Newcomb's could be
called favorable* (See Howey, Marginal Utility School, 
pp * 62-63•)
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Time and several reevaluations of Jevons" work tended to
modify Marshall's feelings; a quarter of a century after
his initial appraisal appeared Marshall wrote:
...1 looked with great excitement for Jevons"
Theory; but he gave me no help in my difficul­
ties and I was vexed. I have since learnt to 
estimate him better. His manysidedness, his 
power of combining statistical with analytical 
investigations, his ever fresh honest sparkling 
individuality and suggestiveness impressed me 
gradually; and I reverence him now as among the 
very greatest of economists.5
This ehange in attitude on the part of Marshall cannot
be called conciliatory; rather, it represents a recognition
of the great theoretical similarity between the works of
the two authorsSchumpeter writes:
„„.Marshall"s theoretical structure, barring its 
technical superiority and various developments 
of detail, is fundamentally the same as that of. 
Jevons, but...the rooms in this new house are 
unnecessarily cluttered up with Ricardian heir­
looms, which receive emphasis quite out of pro­
portion to their operational importance.6
This statement points to several significant questions 
which will form the substance of our diagnosis of Marshal­
lian criticism: firstly, to what extent was Marshall's
evaluation engendered by his disapproval of Jevonian tech-
(r:
nique, rather than by the actual substance of Jevons' 
Theory? And secondly was Marshall so enamoured with
5̂Memorials, p. 99. Bespite his change in attitude, 
Marshall mentioned Jevons less than two dozen times in the 
later editions of Principles.
6Schumpeter, History, p. 837°
classicism and. the ’’heirlooms" in its workshop that he was 
unable to discern the many technical errors which even the 
classicists had committed? Critical points to be touched 
on in our discussion of this latter question include:
(1) the importance of "real cost" factors; (2) Jevons' use 
of mathematics; (3) the ethical implications of the hedon­
istic calculus ; and (4-) Jevons* incomprehension of the role 
of economic time periods.
A. Marshall and Jevonian Technique
In his Essays and Sketches in Biography John Maynard 
Keynes makes an analogy which neatly sums up the essential
7difference between Jevonian and Marshallian technique:'
...Jevons' Theory....(as) the first modern book 
on economics...(is) simple, lucid, unfaltering, 
chiselled in stone where Marshall knits in wool.8
The simile is appropriate. One receives the impression of
two men very hard at work: Jevons, the hasty sculptor,
tirelessly chipping away at bedroek, incognizant of either
technique or detail; Marshall, the precise technician,
stitching each new thread with faultless care, lest an
unwanted flaw mar his fabric. As a master of technique,
Marshall could not be expected to accept the apparent
7'The controversy over economic technique greatly dis­
turbed Marshall and prompted him to write: "There are nine
or sixty ways of constructing tribal lays./And every 
single one of them is right" (Quoted in Memorials, p. 318).
QKeynes, Essays, p. 144.
abandon with which Jevons had approached his Theory. 
(Marshall's own major work, Principles of Economies, was 
the product of more than twenty years' labor, during which 
time he also completed the Economics of Industry (1879) and 
two short monographs, The Pure Theory of Foreign Trade and 
The Pure Theory of Domestic Values). What concerns us here 
is whether or not Marshall's attention to technical detail 
colored his criticisms of the Theory.
Marshall was particularly impatient with Jevons' fre­
quent utilization of causal chains to simplify relation­
ships. It will be recalled that Jevons summarized his 
central position on value as follows;
...Cost of production determines supply;
Supply determines final degree of utility;
Pinal degree of utility determines value.9
Marshall writes;
...the greatest objection of all to (this) 
formal statement of his central doctrine is that 
it does not represent supply price, demand price 
and amount produced as mutually determining one 
another, but as determined one by another in a 
series. It is as though when three balls A, B, 
and G rest against one another in a bowl, 
instead of saying that the position of the three 
mutually determines one another under the action 
of gravity, he had said that A determines B, and 
B determines C. Some one else however with equal 
Justice might say that C determines B and B deter­
mines A. 10
Why not simply invert the order of the catena and express
9Jevons, Theory, p. 165. 
"^Marshall, Principles, p. 56?.
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the causal chain as follows?
...Utility determines the amount that has to be 
supplied,
The amount that has to be supplied determines 
cost of production, ^
Cost of production determines value.
If we are to accept the catena in its original form, what 
prevents us, Marshall asks, from adopting this new form, 
imputing the cause of A to C? The critical point lies in 
the ambiguity of Jevons' third statement that "final degree 
of utility determines value." This seems to infer that 
market prices are arrived at merely through the interaction 
and ultimate balancing of one marginal utility against 
another. But Jevons avoids mention of an equally signifi­
cant factor, the relative purchasing power of consumers,
12which he identifies with the "ratio of exchange." This
confuses cause with effectj7 price ratios are determined:
...not solely by the final degrees of (a good's) 
utility to them, but by these in conjunction 
with the amounts of purchasing power severally 
at their disposal. The exchange value of a 
thing is the same all over a market; but the 
final degrees of utility to which it corresponds 
are not equal at any two parts.13
Had he translated his law of diminishing (marginal) util­
ity into the language of pricing, Jevons might have avoided
Ibid. The implicit assumption behind this new chain 
is that cost of production ultimately determines that supply 
price which is requisite for keeping producers at their 
work.
1 ?See Jevons, Theory, pp. 78-81. 
■^Marshall, Principles, p. 58?.
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this error; but tbe unfortunate confusion of marginal util­
ity with market price and "marginal demand" (the term is 
Marshall's) remains. Davenport writes:
...The concept of marginal utility is, beyond 
question, of great significance in economic anal­
ysis, though...it is often most disastrously con­
fused with marginal purchaser's price, that is, 
with relative marginal utility,— relative subjec­
tive worth, subjective value....But evidently it 
is only the latter concept that has any part or 
share in the term value as a market category, and 
expression of purchasing power. Value in this 
relational sense emerges only when utilities, as 
an individual category, have been, by different 
individuals, conceived relatively to other util­
ities to be displaced....In relative marginal 
utility, loss in terms of something else, the 
thought is carried over into the field of value.
Marshall recognized this confusion and derived the concept
of "marginal demand price," by which he meant the price
.which consumers are willing to pay for an additional unit
15of a given commodity.  ̂ By dropping the identity between 
marginal utility and marginal demand, Marshall is: able to 
give clearer meaning to the concept of market equilibrium.
There can be little doubt that Marshall was the 
superior technician; he could not accept Jevons' over­
simplification of eausal relationships any more than he 
could subscribe to Jevons' fragmentary definitions of 
"trading bodies" and "the law of indifference." But he 
ignores a significant truth: Jevons* organon is important
14■JDavenport, Value, pp. 315-316. 
■^Marshall, Principles, p. 56?•
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not for the method in which it was presented, but for the 
fact that it was rendered at all. What Jevons says in the 
Theory is significant; how he says it is of lesser rele­
vance ;
...Jevons and the Austrians were held up to rid­
icule as people, who, like school children, had 
to be taught that 'when three balls...rest 
against one another in a bowl...the position of 
the three mutually determines one another under 
the action, of gravity'....What Jevons and the 
Austrians really did was not the nonsense imputed 
to them in (this) passage but something very dif­
ferent; they discovered precisely that the posi­
tion of the balls is to be accounted for by a 
single principle, gravitation in the case of 
mechanics, utility in the case of economics.16
This comment by Schumpeter reflects a particular school of 
thought which must, for want of a better term, be called 
”neo-Utilitarian." In contrast to Marshall— who,, as we 
shall see, attempted to discount the viability of the mar­
ginal utility principle— Schumpeter proposes that this 
concept serves as the single most important factor in 
determining market behavior. To test this thesis the next 
section is directed.
B. Real Cost; An Implicit Assumption in Jevonian Analysis?
We generally credit Marshall with having first recon­
ciled the.utility and cost of production approaches to 
value, though the historiography of economics offers sev­
eral examples of writers who anticipated this synthesis.
16Schumpeter, History, p. 922.
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17The earliest attempt can he traced to Galiani, ' who, had 
he possessed the tools of marginal analysis, might have 
equalled Marshall's accomplishment. After Galiani we find 
the division of value theorists into two camps: the Class­
icists, who imputed the cause of value to cost of produc­
tion and only paid lip service to subjective valuation 
(utility); and, secondly, the utilitarians, who reversed 
the "classical" argument and stressed subjective rather 
than cost elements. In either case there is an exaggera­
tion of the importance of one factor over another: only
when the former proves ineffective can the latter have any 
1 Rinfluence.
Marshall found himself in the strange position of
having to reconcile the two principles while, at the same
19time, attempting to defend the Classical case. x He pro­
posed that "...the 'cost of production principle' and the
'final utility’ principle are undoubtedly component parts
20of the one all-ruling law of supply and demand." To 
impute the cause of value to a single factor is to tell 
only half a story. Each of the two principles which
■^See ibid., pp. $00-302.
IQThus Mill writes: "...since cost of production
here fails us we must resort to a law of value anterior to 
cost of production and more fundamental, the law of demand 
and supply" (Quoted in Marshall, Principles, p. 568).
■^See "The Role of Time Periods," p. 93.
20Marshall, Principles, p. 569•
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regulate value
...may be compared to one blade of a pair of scis­
sors. When one blade is held still, and the cut­
ting is effected by moving the other, we may say 
with careless brevity that the cutting is done by 
the second; but the statement is not one to be 
made formally, and defended deliberately.21
Standing behind demand is marginal utility, as expressed in 
the alternative prices which purchasers are willing to pay 
for various quantities of a given commodity; behind supply, 
marginal effort and sacrifice, which are reflected in sup­
ply prices:
...When demand and supply are in equilibrium, the 
amount of the commodity which is being produced 
in a unit of time may be called the equilibrium- 
amount, and the price at which it is being sold 
may be called the equilibrium-price....When 
demand and supply are in (this; stable equilib­
rium, if any accident should move the scale of 
production from its equilibrium position, there 
will be instantly brought into play forces tend­
ing to bring it back to that position; just as, 
if a stone hanging by a string is displaced from 
its equilibrium position, the force of gravity 
will at once tend to bring it back to its equi­
librium position.22
In essence this statement must be accepted as correct:
Marshall's partial equilibrium analysis compares favorably
with what is taught in present-day courses in introductory
economics. But if we are to go beyond this statement to
the actual meanings of "demand price" and "real cost," we
encounter some discrepancies. For instance, at times
21Ibid.
22Ibid. t pp. 4-25-4-26.
Marshall seems as confused as Jevons had been over the
relationship between marginal utility and market price. At
one point he writes in criticism of,Jevons:
...He had led many of his readers into a con­
fusion. ..by speaking without qualification of 
the price of a thing as measuring its final 
utility, not only to the individual, which it 
can do, but also to a 'trading body' which it 
cannot do.23
But then he says:
...For each of (two men, one rich, one poor) 
the marginal utility is measured by sixpence; 
but this marginal utility is greater in the 
ease of the poorer man than in that of thericher.24
His inference is that price may, after all, serve as a mea­
sure of marginal utility to an individual. But since Mar­
shall elsewhere emphatically states that this is not the , 
case, we must regard this statement as an unintentional 
error.
Marshall's handling of the other major determinant of 
value, "real costs," is a bit more awkward. He begins with
the premise that there exists some relationship between the
"real costs of production" and "expenses of production," 
but he seems uncertain as to the nature of this relation­
ship. The former term refers to: /
/
...the exertions of all the different kinds of 
labour that are directly or indirectly involved 
in making (a good); together with the abstinences
25rbid.,. p. 176. 
24Ibid., p. 170.
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or rather the waitings required for saving the 
capital used (in its production).25
"Expenses of production" on the other hand
•...are the prices which have to be paid in order 
to call forth an adequate supply of the efforts 
and waitings that are required for making (a 
good); or, in other words, they are its supplyprice.26
Marshall's implication seems to be that real costs are
those shared by persons who supply their factor inputs to
the entrepreneur; while expenses of production are costs
27from the point of view of the entrepreneur himself. Per­
haps thiŝ  is a valid distinction. But this still says 
nothing of the de facto relation between the two items.
Are we to assume that the amount of sacrifice in effort and 
abstinence varies in direct proportion to the amount of the 
payments for productive services; or, furthermore, that 
there always exists an identity between the two amounts? 
Marshall never tells us. What is even more disturbing is 
his equation of expenses of production and supply price.
If we are to accept his definition of the former— which 
includes only the minimum or "necessary" costs incurred by 
entrepreneurs— we must assume that entrepreneurs have 
nothing left in the form of profits; such an assumption is 
clearly unreasonable. We conclude then that this second 
identity is specious and that it will hold only when
^Ibid., p. 4-18.
^ Ibid. ^See Davenport, Value, pp. 373-374-.
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profits are added ‘to expense costs.
This brings us to an important question: is the con­
cept of real cost implicit in the writings of Jevons?
There is a good case which Schumpeter offers for the
poaffirmative:
...(Jevons) stood in no need of being told about 
the two blades of Marshall1s pair of scissors.
What (he) aimed at showing was that both blades 
consist of the same material— that both demand 
and supply (no matter whether the case is one of 
exchanging existing commodities or one of produc-pq 
ing them) may be explained in terms of 'utility*.
The reader will recall that Jevons introduces 'disutili­
ties' on the same level as utilities: economics is the
calculus of not only pleasure, but also of its converse,
xnpain. In his treatment of equilibrium exchange^ he pro­
poses that beyond some point successive 'utils' can only be 
obtained at an increasingly greater sacrifice. At the 
fountainhead of disutility two forces are brought into 
play: exertion in the case of labor, abstinence in the
case of capital. Regarding the first of these, Jevons 
writes:
...By far the most important instance of nega­
tive value is labour....Labour in the economic
p o In defining the scope of this paper, the author has 
avoided Jevons' analysis of distributive shares, since 
this is another subject altogether. The following argument 
forms an exception to the prescribed rules, but this 
digression on labor and capital is necessary in order to 
corroborate Schumpeter's argument.
29Schumpeter, History, p. 922.
^See Jevons, Theory, pp. 95-98.
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sense of the term is essentially disutility, 
because it involves painful exertion; it is that 
which we give in production in order to obtain 
commodities. The labour given is painful to the 
giver....Thus the crossing-sweeper incurs tedious 
labour to ward off inconvenience and discomfort 
from the wayfarer.31
The disutility attaching to the acquisition of a rate of
return on invested capital is also important, though less
obvious. Capital is defined as:
...the aggregate of those commodities which are 
required for sustaining labourers of any kind... 
engaged in work....(It) allows us to expend 
labour in advance. Thus, to raise corn we need 
to turn over the surface of the soil. If we 
proceed straight to the work, and use the imple­
ments with which nature has furnished us-— our . 
fingers-— we should spend -an enormous amount of 
painful labour with very little result. It is 
far better, therefore, to spend the first part 
of pur labour in making a spade...to assist the 
rest of our labour....(Thus) it is necessary to 
begin the spending of labour a long time before 
any goods can be finished.32
In other words only the crudest production process does not
require some sort of abstinence; the more complicated a
process becomes, the longer the period of abstinence.
(There is an obvious parallel between this and Bbhm-Bawerk's
"roundabout production'  ̂concept.) The rate of return on
invested capital represents a payment for the disutility
31 ̂Jevons, Principles, p. 135»
^Jevons, Theory, pp. 223, 226-22?. It is strange 
that Jevons, who was so disturbed by the classical emphasis 
on labor-cost, should frame his capital concept in these 
terms.
33^See E. V. Bohm-Bawerk, The Positive Theory of Capi­
tal , London, MacMillan & Co., 1891, pp. 17-23„
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incurred in abstaining from present consumption and is 
equal to "the rate of increase of the produce (as a func­
tion of time) divided by the whole of the produce."^’
In short, Jevons uses the disutility concept as a 
vehicle for introducting cost elements into his fabric, but 
he does this only by implication. In contrasting his 
statements on disutility with Marshall's definition of 
"real costs" we find a similarity which neither author 
would probably have acknowledged. In both instances costs 
are measured in terms of 'sacrifice'; if we are to accept 
Schumpeter's argument, we find that the only important dif­
ference between the two theories is this: whereas Mar­
shall's delineation of cost phenomena is articulate and 
precise, Jevons' is allusive and therefore more amenable to 
the criticisms of those who would discount the heuristic 
importance of the marginal utility concept.
0• Jevons' Use of Mathematics
The quest for a concise language for expressing their 
theories had led economists down three distinct paths by 
1890: first were those writers— virtually all of the Mer­
cantilists and Classicists fall in this category— who con-
-55fined themselves to non-mathematical exposition*,  ̂next 
xn ̂Stigler, Production, p. 27.
^"Numerical or algebraic formulations and numerical 
calculations had occurred of course in the earlier stages 
of economic analysis: there were the political
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there were those who, mindful of the limitations of "liter­
ary economics," pioneered the graphic method: Dupuit (1844)
and Jenkin (1871) were notable precursors of this approach;
and finally in the writings of Bernouilli (1731), von Thxinen
(1826), Cournot (1838) and Jevons (1871) we see the growth 
of symbolic notation and mathematical economics. What we 
would call "modern analysis" is of course a blending of all 
three approaches; the synthesis is an accepted fact. But 
economists have come to recognize the value of all three 
approaches only within recent years. To anyone who has 
studied economic journals over the past seventy-five years 
the trend is obvious. It was not so apparent at the time 
Marshall wrote Principles in 1890. In contrast to Jevons* 
quasi-mathematical Theory, Principles stands as a monument 
to literary economics and the graphic method. Though he 
felt a great respect for mathematics, Marshall doubted its 
applicability to economic science. In a letter (1906) to 
Arthur Lyon Bowley he wrote:
...I know I had a growing feeling in the later
years of my work at the subject that a good
mathematical theorem dealing with economic 
hypotheses was very unlikely to be good eco­
nomics: and I went more and more on the rules:
(1) Use mathematics as a shorthand language 
rather than as an engine of enquiry. (2) Keep 
to them until you have done. (3) Translate 
into English. (4) Then illustrate by examples
arithmeticians, the physiocrats, and many isolated instances 
such as Brisco, Ceva...Condillac...(and to a limited extent) 
Ricardo.„.and Marx. But (this) does not constitute mathe­
matical economics" (Schumpeter, History, pp. 954-955)*
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that are important in real life. (5) Burn the 
mathematics, (6) If you can't succeed in (4) 
burn (3).36
More than anything Marshall feared that economists would
become so enamoured with mathematics that they would leave
off studying real world conditions and devote their ener-
37gies to the construction of "economic toys."^' This is 
the key to his indictment against Jevons' mathematics:
Professor Jevons has expressed almost all of 
his reasonings in the English language, but he 
has also expressed almost all of them in the 
mathematical,,,.We owe several valuable sugges­
tions to the many investigations in which 
skilled mathematicians.have applied their 
favourite method to the treatment of economical 
problems. But all that has been important in 
their reasonings and results has, with scarcely 
an exception, been capable of being described 
in ordinary language....(The Theory) would be 
improved if the mathematics were omitted, but 
the diagrams retained.38
A skilled mathematician in his own right, Marshall was
appalled by Jevons' not infrequent misuse of mathematical
reasoning. In his review of the Theory Marshall writes:
...(Jevons) has not...fully availed himself of 
the accuracy which he might have derived from 
the use of (mathematics)....(In the first place) 
he does not always point out what are the vari­
ables as a function of which his quantities are 
expressed. It is often necessary to understand 
independently the whole of his reasoning, in 
order to know whether he means his differential 
co-efficients to be total or partial; and in
“̂ Quoted in C. Pigou, Alfred Marshall and Current 
Thought, London, MacMillan & Co., l953> PP° 8-9»
37-^See ibid., pp. 9-12.
-^Memorials, pp. 97-99.
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several cases he seems almost to have himself 
forgotten that they are total.39
Marshall also questions Jevons' repeated ambivalence in
symbolic notation, as manifested in the latter's shifting
from differentiation to the delta process and baek to dif- 
40ferentiation. To carry his point to an extreme, Marshall 
makes an attempt at integrating a number of Jevons' deriva­
tives :
.. .A point on a locus may be determined by an 
equation with a differential co-efficient in 
it. (But) if we integrate (Jevons') equation, 
we get, not this locus, but some other inter­
secting it at the point to be determined
These errors might seem minor compared with Jevons' posi­
tive contributions, but their presence in a work of such 
importance was, in Marshall's estimation, clearly inadmis­
sible. But here is where Marshall's criticism of Jevons' 
mathematics ends: he did not— as he might have done quite
justifiably— pursue the point. And it is in this area that 
Jevons was most open to attack.
D. Ethical Implications of Utilitarian Economics: "Hedonics"
Of the many possible explanations for Marshall's dis­
trust of the mathematical approach, one stands out above 
the rest: Jevons and other utilitarian writers had used
mathematics to cement an illegitimate union between economies
^ Memorials, p. 98.
40See Jevons, Theory, pp. 95, 98, 130.
41Memorials, ibid.
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42and ethics. "Hedonics," the product of this union, was a 
subject which must be outside the province of economic 
theoreticians, since it precludes the making of unscien­
tific "value judgments":
...It has however unfortunately happened that 
customary uses of economic terms have sometimes 
suggested the belief that economists are adher­
ents of the philosophical system of Hedonism or 
Utilitarianism. For, while they have generally 
taken for granted that the greatest pleasures 
are those which come with the endeavor to do 
one's duty, they have spoken of 'pleasures' and 
'pains' as supplying the motives to all action.^3
Jevons apparently thought he had absolved himself from the
fallacy of hedonics when he wrote:
...I have never felt that there is anything in. 
(hedonism) to prevent our putting the widest 
and highest interpretation upon the terms used.^
But in this regard his achievement was not up to his inten­
tions: he walks a fine line between ethics and economics
and often fails to distinguish between "desires" to maxi­
mize utility and "motives" behind these desires. Marshall 
writes:
...It is true that this large use of 'pain and 
pleasure' has sometimes served as a bridge by 
which to pass from individualistic Hedonism to 
a complete ethieal creed....(but) it is clearly
42Marshall has inaccurately been accorded credit for 
having originated the phrase "hedonics." The author has 
traced its origin to a pamphlet by J. Grote entitled A 
Treatise on Moral Ideas. See the Oxford English Dictionary, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933, vol. V, pp. 189-190.
^Marshall, Principles, p. 77°
44Jevons, Theory, p. 23.
not the part of economics to appear to take a
side in ethical controversy <,4-5
Yet all too frequently the accuser seems as guilty as
the accused. Marshall's first edition of Principles hears
most of the marks of utilitarian analysis, as can he seen 
in his habitual use of such hedonistic catch-words as "max­
imum pleasure," "minimum pain," and the phrase "terminal- 
value-in-use" (which corresponds to Jevons' "final degree 
of utility")o^ Subsequent editions were revised to weed 
out these utilitarian tracings— he replaced Jevons' "pain" 
and "pleasure" with the equally generic "dissatisfaction" 
and "satisfaction"-— hut the fact remains that Marshall was 
never quite able to free himself completely from the yoke 
of hedonics: "satisfaction," like Jevons5 "pleasure," is
to be pursued not for its own sake, but for the purpose of
t±nsocial betterment. ' In principle Marshall had trouble
accepting the unscientific alliance of economics and ethics
in practice he found it difficult to reject the role of
social reformer. Pigou writes:
... economies for him was a handmaid to ethics, 
not an end in itself, but a means to a further 
end: an instrument, by the perfecting of which
45̂Marshall, Principles, p. 78.
46See Howey, Marginal Utility School, pp. 84-85; also 
P. T. Homan, Contemporary Economic Thought, New York, 
Harper, 1928, p. 270.
^See Memorials, p. 84.
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it might be possible to better the conditions of 
human life.^8
E. The Role of Time Periods
Of no less concern to Marshall was Jevons’ apparent
incomprehension of the role of time periods and the effect
which changes over time have on price; even Ricardo had
been guilty of this error:
...The carelessness of Ricardo with regard to 
the element of Time has been imitated by his 
critics, and has thus been a source of twofold 
misunderstanding. Eor they attempt to disprove 
doctrines as to the ultimate tendencies, the 
causes of causes, the causae causantes, of the 
relations between cost of production and value, 
by means of arguments based on the causes of 
temporary changes, and short-period fluctuations 
of value.4-9
To an extent Marshall's statement is correct, for Jevons
had virtually nothing to say about short- and long-run 
50pricing:^ the exchange rates which he arrives at always 
express marginal utility in relation to a fixed supply;
4-8Ibid., p. 93. See also 1883 lecture by Marshall, 
quoted in ibid., p. 83.
^Marshall, Principles, pp. 569-570.
50A brief summary of Marshall’s position on time 
periods might be apropos: he distinguishes four periods,
each of which is characterized by a different set of forces. 
In the first or -'market" period "’supply' is taken to mean 
the stock of the commodity in question which is on hand" 
(ibid., p. 451). In this instance supply is perfectly 
inelastic and an increase in amount demanded will be matched 
by a concomitant, equal increase in market price. There is 
no entry or exit of either firms or factors. In the 
"short-period" we allow for factor changes: '"supply1
means broadly what can be produced for the price in ques­
tion with the existing stock of plant...in a given time"
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that is, he assumes all supply curves are perfectly inelas­
tic. But Marshall goes to the opposite extreme when he says:
...Thus...as a general rule, the shorter the 
period which we are considering, the greater 
must he the share of our attention which is 
given to the influence of demand on value; and 
the longer the period, the more important will 
be the influence of cost-of-production on 
value.51
What he appears to forget is his own principle of the pair 
of scissors: the forces behind both demand and supply will
determine price, regardless of the time period under con­
sideration. The only distinction that would even partially 
justify his statement is that in the long-run firms must 
always cover out-of-pocket or marginal costs, whereas this 
does not hold in the market period. Schumpeter criticizes 
Marshall's reasoning by way of an analogy:
(ibid.). Owing to the relative inelasticity of supply, an 
increase in amount demanded will result in a price which is 
greater than the original equilibrium price, but less than 
the aforementioned market price. Entry or exit of firms is 
impossible. In the long-run "'supply means what can be 
produced by plant, which itself can be remuneratively pro­
duced and applied within the given time" (ibid.) Factors 
will enter in order for firms to achieve optimal effi­
ciency; firms will also enter in order to take advantage of 
the greater profit opportunities. Those faeing long-run 
losses will leave. Given the increased supply potential 
(and assuming increasing costs), the long-run supply curve 
will be relatively elastic and at its point of intersection 
with the demand curve a "normal price" will prevail. Mar­
shall's fourth period, commonly referred to as the "long, 
long run," involves secular movements of normal price 
"caused by gradual growth of knowledge, of population and 
of capital, and the changing conditions of demand and sup­
ply from one generation to another" (ibid.).
51Ibid., p. 429.
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...In its general import...(this statement) 
gives the wrong lead...it is wrong to say that 
foreign exchanges are determined by supply and 
demand in the case of paper currencies, and by 
the gold mechanism in the ease of gold curren­
cies; what should be said is that the factors 
behind supply and demand determine foreign 
exchange rates, in any case, but that in the 
case of gold currencies the gold mechanism will 
in general prevent departure from gold parities 
beyond the gold points.52
Marshall seems to imply that the marginal utility and cost- 
of-production principles are independent of one another; 
but we know from the foregoing that this was not his inten­
tion. The fact is that at the center of Marshall's system 
is the "fictional stationary state" in which cost-of- 
production would always govern value or "normal price":
...Each element of cost would be governed by 
'natural laws', subject to some control from 
fixed custom. There would be no reflex influ­
ence of demand; no fundamental difference 
between the immediate and the later effects of 
economic causes.53
Jevons and other writers before him had implied that
dynamic analysis was virtually impossible, given the exist-
54ing state of economic scienee. Marshall regarded this as 
an evasion of the issue and used the stationary state 
device to bridge the gap between statics and what he wrongly 
called "dynamics." In this mythical state the influences
52Schumpeter, History, pp. 921-922.
-^Marshall, Principles, p. 4-4-0. Marshall treats this 
for what it is: a device which is conceptually valuable but
of no practical importance in the real world. (See ibid.) >
54v See Jevons, Theory, pp. 93-94-.
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which exerted themselves on value in the aforementioned
periods become irrelevant:
...The general conditions of production and con­
sumption, of distribution and exchange remain 
motionless; but yet it is full of movement; for 
it is a mode of life.55
There is no need to consider the effect which changes in
tastes, technology or factor availability have on price,
for they are assumed constant over time. And since this is
so, entrepreneurs will come to expect this constancy; thus
price-expectations also are unimportant:
...In the stationary state then the plain rule 
would be the cost of production ("normal cost' 
faced by a'representative firnf) governs value 
("normal price').56
We conclude from the above that Marshall's analysis of 
the time element shows a marked advance over Jevons' 
implicit treatment of time in the Theory. Indeed, Marshall 
had just cause for criticizing Jevons' preoccupation with 
the "market period" and for his complete ignorance of 
short- and long-run equilibria.
But both men approached the same problem from differ­
ent angles and achieved different results. Taken in con­
text, neither treatment is incorrect: if we confine
55•^Marshall, Principles, p. 439« This device is 
supplemented by the concept of the "representative firm," a 
quasi-"average" unit whose economies depended upon the 
aggregate production of the good it produced. See ibid., 
pp. 397, 422, 450, 514.
56Ibid., p. 440. See also J. R. Hicks, Value and Cap­
ital , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1946, p. 117.
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ourselves to the market period, we have no problem justify­
ing Jevons' statement that final degree of utility (demand) 
determines value; conversely, if we make use of Marshall's 
"stationary state" model, we can defend his thesis that 
value is determined by costs of production„ What we cannot 
accept., however, is the fact that Marshall bases his criti­
cism of devonian statics on a quasi-dynamic model. He 
apparently ignores the fact that Jevons explicitly stated 
that he was working within a static framework in which the 
so-called "streams of trade” were assumed constant. Once 
this is realized, we are forced to conclude that Marshall's 
criticisms are really irrelevant.
CHAPTER VI 
Conclusion
Whenever we probe below the surface of a body of eco­
nomic ideas, we are certain to uncover a number of faetors 
which belie the importance of these ideas. So it has been 
with our brief synopsis and evaluation of Jevonian value 
theory. In PART I, when we traced the circuitous path by 
which Jevons expanded on the marginal utility principle, 
we discovered that many of his thoughts were not wholly 
original, but had been inherited from the English hedon­
ists, the French mathematical writers, and various members 
of the Oxford Utility School. And again in PART II, when 
we examined the Theory in terms of Marshallian criticisms 
and Schumpeterian counter-criticisms, we questioned the 
validity of Jevons" generalization of marginal utility, 
and pointed to several significant technical errors in 
Jevons" deduction. We must now determine the extent to 
which these factors detract from the Jevonian organon.
Jevons" single most important achievement was the 
statement of the principle of diminishing marginal utility. 
It was this device which permitted him to break free of the 
Classical, production-oriented economics and to focus
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consideration on the consumption problem. We have noted 
several antecedents to Jevons * 'treatment of this problem-- 
Gossen's "Second Law" and Senior's "Law of Variety" are 
perhaps the most obvious— but Jevons must be credited with 
having first portrayed the problem in a rigorous manner, 
using mathematical notation. He is the first English 
writer to define marginal utility as the first derivative 
of an individual's utility function. Once the significance 
of this achievement is realized, the many technical flaws 
in his theory— the vague definitions, the naive "causal 
chains," and even his obtuse extensions of the basic 
exchange equation1— become irrelevant. Why then do many 
current economic historians discount the importance of 
Jevons' accomplishment?
We offer three explanations. In the first place most 
writers tend to group Jevons with his contemporaries— the 
Austrians, and Walras, and Pareto. Consequently, his 
achievements are dwarfed by the collective contributions of 
all these utilitarian writers. Only the less positive 
aspects of Jevons' deduction remain: (1) his treatment of
marginal utility as a function of only a single commodity;
(2) his failure to develop a dynamic model based on flow-
prather than stock-variables; (3) bis confusion of barter
■'■Jevons, Theory, p. 100.
pSee ibid, pp. 93-94; also Hutchison, Review, p. 43.
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and freely competitive exchange conditions; (4) his exclu­
sive reliance upon market period analysis; and (5) his so-, 
called "hedonics." As we are reminded by current writers, 
the progress of economic science has underscored the 
seriousness of Jevons" errors. We must agree. What we 
cannot accept, however, is the alacrity with which these 
same writers dismiss Jevons as being the first English econ­
omist to present the marginal utility device rigorously.
A second explanation for the lack of concern for 
Jevons" work is an historical one. As we noted in PART II, 
Marshall took great pains to discount the significance of 
the Theory. There is little doubt that he succeeded. 
Moreover, he also succeeded in presenting a theory which 
drew largely on the very concept for which he had criti­
cized Jevons. We must credit him with having put value 
theory in its proper perspective, by uniting the cost-of- 
production and utility approaches. But we must not lose 
sight of the fact that he was the originator of neither 
approach, and that, as regards the latter, much of what 
Marshall said had already been phrased in a less eloquent 
way by Jevons.
The final reason which we offer for the current inat­
tention to Jevons" Theory relates to the problems inherent 
in utilitarian measurement. The de facto value of the mar­
ginal utility device remains today as a subject of economic 
controversy. Most writers, following Marshall’s line of
reasoning to a certain extent, would question the real sig­
nificance of this device on the grounds that it presupposes 
interpersonal utility comparison, poses behavioral questions 
which fall within the province of psychology and sociology, 
and leads economists into the unscientific realm of value 
judgments. Others, aligning themselves with the "neo- 
Utilitarians," consider the device so important as to make 
these difficulties seem insignificant. We touched upon 
this problem in PJLRT II' s digression on "real cost," at 
which time the author left it open for debate. His reasons 
for doing so can be best explained in a paragraph from 
Jevons' last completed work:
...We must agree to differ, and though we are 
bound to argue fearlessly, it should be with the 
consciousness that there is room for wide and 
bona fide difference of opinion. We must consent 
to advance eautiously, step by step, feeling our 
way, adopting no foregone conclusions, trusting 
no single science, expecting no infallible 
guide....We must recognize the fact clearly that 
we have to deal with complex aggregates of people 
and institutions, which we cannot usually dissect 
and treat piece-meal. Tolerance, therefore, is 
indispensable.3
-'Jevons, The State in Eelation to Labour, p. 166.
APPENDIX
It was during the year 1851°that I began to 
think that I eould and ought to do more than 
others. A vague desire and determination grew 
upon me....I felt it to be almost presumptuous 
to pronounce to myself the hopes I held and the 
schemes I formed. Time alone eould reveal 
whether they were empty or real; only when 
proved real could they be known to others.
William Stanley Jevons
APPENDIX A
Consumers' Behavior:
The Transition to Twentieth-Century Analysis
Prom the foregoing the reader might receive the false 
impression that demand theory begins and ends with Jevons' 
formulation of the marginal utility approach. However, to 
assume that his theory is the correct one, or even the only 
one, is to ignore a very significant part of economic lit­
erature. In this appendix the author will attempt to out­
line the major developments in demand analysis which took 
place in the interim between Jevons' Theory (1871) and 
Hicks' Revision of Demand Theory (1956).
Although the distinction between various approaches to 
demand is not always obvious, we can generally describe 
five stages'*' in the evolution of demand theory. We begin, 
of course, with Jevons. What characterizes this first 
stage has already been set out and may be summarized as 
follows: (1) acceptance of the cardinal utility principle,
whether explicitly (in the case of the Oxford Utility 
School) or, implicitly (in the writings of Jevons, Marshall,
■̂ See Stigler, "Utility Theory"; also Hutchison, Review, 
pp. 503-30?.
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and Walras); (2) incomprehension of complementary relation­
ships between goods (Marshall is the exception); and (3)
treatment of marginal utility as a function of a single 
2good.
We can broadly define the second stage in the develop­
ment of demand theory in terms of two contributions by 
Edgeworth, and Auspitz and Lieben, respectively: (l) the
treatment of marginal utility as a function of the quanti­
ties of all goods involved in a person's consumption pat­
tern; and (2) the introduction of complementarity between 
goods. It must be noted that all three of these writers 
anticipate "indifference curve analysis," although their 
method of presentation is less rigorous than that of Vil- 
fredo Pareto, who is properly classed in the next period.
In Mathematical Psychics Edgeworth combines indifference 
curves— which, unlike their present familiar form, are 
drawn concave to the origin— and price-lines to determine 
a point of maximum consumer satisfaction. Auspitz and 
Lieben*s "constant-satisfaction curves" bear a close simi­
larity to the Edgeworth curves, although there is evidence
4that they arrived at their analysis independently.
The writings of Pareto and Fisher reflect what we
^Ibid., p. 303»
’3̂See Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics, pp. 21-22.
4See R. Auspitz and R. Lieben, Untersuchungen Uber die
Theorie des Preises, Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1889. ~
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shall call the third period in the evolution of demand 
theory. Realization of the limitations imposed by the car­
dinality problem led these men to a non-ntility analysis of 
consumer behavior. The earlier indifference curve analysis 
provided a means for extruding "utility” from value theory 
as being measureable. That they did not wholly succeed in 
accomplishing this can be attributed to the fact that
neither of these men was able to redefine the law of dimin-
5ishing utility and complementarity in non-utility terms.
A major development occurred in the fourth stage with
the introduction of the concept of the "marginal rate of
substitution." Although we generally credit Hicks with
having conceived this device, its origin can be traced to
the writings of two earlier economists who published during
the second decade of this century. W. E. Johnson's article
on "The Pure Theory of Utility Curves" (1913) outlines the
general form of the concept, however less rigorously than
his successors:
...This impossibility of measurement does not 
affect any economic problem. Neither does eco­
nomies need to know the marginal (rate of) 
utility of a commodity. What is needed is a 
representation of the ratio of one marginal 
utility to another. In fact, this ratio is pre­
cisely represented by the slope at any point of 
the utility curve.6
5^See Hutchison, Review, p. 303*
^W. E. Johnson, "The Pure Theory of Utility Curves,"
Economic Journal, 1913* P« 4-90.
-106-
What Johnson states implicitly, Slutsky expresses explicitly
7in his "Sulla Theoria del Bilancio del Consummatore."' In 
this highly mathematical article Slutsky completes the 
extrusion of utility, thereby anticipating much of the later 
deduction by Hicks and Allen. He rightly deserves credit 
for having rigorously distinguished between the substitution
Qand income effects of price changes. A rediscovery of his
work by Hicks and Allen took place in 1934-» their findings
being published in "A Reconsideration of the Theory of 
9Value."' But perhaps the most representative work of this 
period is Hicks' Value and Capital (1939)- In essence this 
book is an attempt to redefine consumer behavior in non­
utility terms, thereby bypassing the unnecessary cardinal­
ity assumptions of earlier writers. Two of the more
7'E. Slutsky, "Sulla Theoria del Bilancio del Consum- 
matore," Giornale degli Economisti, LI, 1915 • See also 
R. G. D. Allen, "Professor Slutsky's Theory of Consumer's 
Choice," Review of Economic Studies, IV, 1936.
O A complete separation of these two effects is pos­
sible only when we use the indifference-curve approach to 
demand. If we assume the price of X to fall relative to 
the price of Y, the effects can be isolated as follows: 
the substitution effect (with real income temporarily held 
constant) is shown by a shift along the same indifference 
curve towards the X axis; conversely, the income effect 
represents the change in real income whieh is generated by 
the price change, and would be shown by a movement to a 
higher indifference curve. For further information see R. 
H. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation, New 
York, Rhinehart & Go., pp. 87-90; also Hicks, Value, pp.
qJ. R. Hicks and R. G. D. Allen, "A Reconsideration 
of the Theory of Value," Economica, III, 1934-.
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outstanding devices which Hicks uses to accomplish this are 
(1) the marginal rate of substitution, which replaces Jevons’ 
marginal utility; and, following from this, (2) the principle 
of diminishing marginal rate of substitution, supplanting 
diminishing marginal utility. Each indifference curve will 
show a given scale of preferences which an individual con­
sumer applies to two commodities. According to this approach 
consumers are unable to quantify the satisfactions derived 
from the consumption of a good. All that can be said is
that each individual will prefer one scale of preferences
to another, the former being represented by a higher curve 
on his "indifference map." We must assume that the two 
goods displayed on the map are substitutable, so that as 
relative prices change the substitution effect can be 
brought into play. At any single point along an indiffer­
ence curve we can define its slope in terms of a ratio 
between the marginal utilities of the two goods. Hicks 
prefers to abandon the term "ratio of utilities" for his 
own phrase, the marginal rate of substitution:
...We may define the marginal rate of substitu­
tion of X for Y as the quantity of Y which would
just compensate the consumer for the loss of a
marginal unit of X.10
Through this device we eliminate the problem of cardinal
measurement. The concept is particularly significant when
we wish to describe an equilibrium with respect to a system
■^Hicks, Value, p. 20.
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of market prices. At this point a consumer's marginal rate 
of substitution between two goods will equal the ratio of 
prices of these goods. Were this not so, a consumer would 
find it advantageous to substitute more units of one good 
for a marginal unit of another, therefore achieving a new 
equilibrium. In terms of the indifference map equilibrium 
is shown by the tangency of a single curve and the so- 
called "price-line."
Hicks goes on to say that if we are to attack the mar­
ginal utility device, we must also destroy the principle 
upon which it is founded, diminishing marginal utility.
But what can we substitute for it?
...By the rule that the indifference curves must 
be convex to the axes. This may be called...the 
principle of diminishing marginal rate of sub­
stitution. 11
Indifference curve convexity will dictate the follow­
ing :
...Suppose we start with a given quantity of 
goods, and then go on increasing the amount of X 
and diminishing that of Y in such a way that the 
consumer is left neither better off nor worse off 
on balance; then the amount of Y which has to be 
subtracted in order to set off a second unit of X 
will be less than that which has to be subtracted 
in order to set off the first unit. In other 
words, the more X is substituted for Y, the less 
will be the marginal rate of substitution of X for Y.12
This is not the same as diminishing marginal utility,
1]Tbid.
IPIbid., pp. 20-21.
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although hoth concepts are employed for similar reasons:
that is, to define an equilibrium condition.
...Unless, at the point of equilibrium, the mar­
ginal rate of substitution is diminishing, equi­
librium will not be stable.13
Hence, we can have a situation develop in which the marginal 
rate of substitution will be equal to the price ratio, and 
still not have an equilibrium. The reason is quite obvious: 
this identity can hold under conditions of both increasing 
and diminishing marginal rate of substitution. If the lat­
ter case is in effect, and the identity holds, the equilib­
rium must necessarily be a stable one. But if the marginal 
rate of substitution is increasing, and (again) the iden­
tity holds, consumers will find it advantageous to acquire 
a larger quantity of commodity; therefore, they would move 
to a new equilibrium position:
...It is clear, therefore, that for any point to 
be a possible rate of equilibrium at appropriate 
prices the marginal rate of substitution at that 
point must be diminishing.!^
These concepts can best be clarified by a diagram, in whieh
AB represents a consumer’s indifference curve and ML, his
price line:
^ Ibid. , p. 21.
14Ibid., p. 22.
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The reader will observe that at point Q /there is an equa­
tion of the marginal rate of substitution and the priee- 
ratio, beeause of the tangency of the indifference curve 
and the price-line. However, this cannot be a stable equi­
librium, since at this point the marginal rate of substitu­
tion is increasing; that is, the indifference curve is 
concave to the axis. This implies that by moving to the 
right or left of Q the consumer is able to reach a higher 
indifference curve, thereby disturbing the original equi­
librium. He would proceed until he reached another point 
at which a diminishing marginal rate of substitution was 
equal to the price ratio, and would remain there until some 
exogenous chapge brought about an increase in real income, 
allowing him to move to a higher indifference curve.
While the writings of economists of the fourth stage 
represent a definite advance in the literature, they have 
come under close scrutiny in the past few years. We are 
now in the process of approaching a fifth stage in the
-Ill-
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evolution .of demand theory. The outlines of this new
15approach are sketched in a number of journal articles  ̂and 
a very few hooks published during the last two decades. 
Included in the latter category is Hicks' Revision of 
Demand Theory; which is his attempt at revising certain 
parts of Value and Capital.
The essential distinction between Hicks' new approach 
and that of earlier economists is that it takes advantage 
of econometric method and the so-called "preference hypoth­
esis."
...Faced with factual data about quantities of 
commodities purchased and with the task of
■^For further information see: F. Machlup, "Profes­
sor Hicks' Revision of Demand Theory," American Economic 
Review, XLVII, March, 1957*
F. Machlup,."The Problem of Verification in Eco­
nomics," Southern Economic Journal, XXII, July, 1955.
. W. E. Armstrong, "Theory of Consumers' Behavior," 
Oxford Economic Papers, 1950.
P. K. Newman, "The Foundations of Revealed Preference 
Theory," Oxford Economic Papers, June, 1955«
H. S. Houthakker, "Revealed Preference and the Util­
ity Function," Economica, XVII, 1950.
0. Lange, "Complementarity and Inter-relations of 
Shifts in Demand," Review of Economic Studies, VIII, Octo­
ber, 194-0.
S. Ichimura, "A Critical Note on the Definition of 
Related Goods," Review of Economic Studies, XVIII, 1950-51.
P. A. Samuelson, "Consumption Theorems in Terms of 
Over-compensation rather than Indifference Comparisons," 
Economica, XX, 1955.
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explaining changes in these quantities, the econ­
omist has at least three possibilities: explana­
tions in terms of nonprice data, explanations in 
terms of effects of current price changes, and 
explanations in terms of lagged effects of price 
changes.16
What is needed is some method of isolating current-price
effects from the other effects:
...The econometric purpose of the theory of 
demand is to give assistance in making this sep­
aration. ...The kind of theory which is needed... 
is one which will tell us something about the 
ways in which consumers would be likely to react 
if variations in current prices and incomes were 
the only causes of changes in consumption.17
This theory necessitates postulating an "ideal consumer,"
who, by definition, is unaffected by anything other than
current market conditions. Using this postulate we are
able to formulate certain principles of consumer behavior:
...The assumption of behavior according to a 
scale of preferences comes in here as the sim­
plest hypothesis....What (is meant) by action 
according to a scale of preferences is the fol­
lowing. The ideal consumer... chooses that 
alternative, out of the various alternatives 
open to him, which he most prefers, or ranks 
most highly. In one set of market conditions 
he makes one choice, in others other choices; 
but the choices he makes always express the 
same ordering, and must therefore be consistentwith one another.18
16Machlup, "Professor Hicks' Revision of Demand 
Theory," p. 120.
17'J. R. Hicks, A Revision of Demand Theory, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1956, p. 17.
18Ibid., pp. 17-18. Hicks admits that empirical test­
ing of the preference hypothesis is not possible: "I feel
obliged to conclude...that there is in practice no direct 
test of the preference hypothesis" (ibid., p. 58).
Economists must take care to distinguish between the two 
general types of logical ordering: "strong ordering,” in
which each commodity has a special, unique place in the 
order; and "weak ordering," in which certain commodities 
cluster in groups, and it becomes impossible to place one 
ahead of another. (An example of the latter is the indif­
ference curve, since any point along a single curve is 
equally desirable as all other points.) When commodities 
are available only in discrete units, we must acknowledge 
the superiority of strong ordering. But "strong ordering 
has to be given up" whenever commodities are imperfectly 
divisible and the money used to purchase these goods is 
"finely divisible." Hicks prefers the latter approach, but 
admits that acceptance of it requires us to adopt two basic 
assumptions:
...that the consumer will, always prefer a larger 
amount of money to a smaller amount and that his 
preference order is transitive.19
The latter assumption of transitivity implies that all
items in a set are capable of being ordered in a "straight-
20forward unidirectional manner.”
Once we accept the logic of weak ordering and the two 
additional assumptions, we are able to deduce all the major 
principles of the theory of consumer's demand. The
■^Machlup, "Professor Hicks'," p. 121. 
20Hicks, Revision, p. 27.
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simplest case is, of course, that of the demand for a single 
commodity. Under this condition, a consumer is "...con­
fronted with a market in which the price of no more than.one
21good is liable to change." His actions will depend on the
principle of downward-sioping demand. We can prove this by
isolating the substitution and income effects. The former
will depend upon the so-called "consistency condition"
(which is Hicks' term for the first assumption above). He
demonstrates that this effect acts to increase the quantity
demanded of a good when the good sells at a reduced price.
Conversely, the income effect will depend on what Hicks'
calls "observation" (Machlup prefers to define this effect
in terms of. "normal" and "inferior” goods, which amounts to
22the same thing). When we deal with normal goods, the
income and substitution effects of a change in price will
be similar. But in the case of inferior goods— the so-
2;5called "Giffen Case" ^— we have an exception to the law of
downward-sloping demand. In this instance the substitution
effect is much smaller than the income effect, and "the
proportion of income spent upon the inferior good must be 
24large."
21Ibid., p. 47.
22See Machlup, "Professor Hicks," pp. 121-122.
27>̂See Hicks, Revision, p. 67.
2^Ibid., p. 66.
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But economists are incorrect in assuming that the 
income and substitution effects can be nicely isolated as 
we have described. In actuality there is not one, but sev­
eral pairs of effects, each referring to a different set of 
price variations. Delineation of these effects forms the 
largest part of Hicks' Revision of Demand Iheory and cannot 
be summarized here. For further information the reader is 
referred to this work and others which have already been 
listed in the author's footnotes.
APPENDIX B
Jevons1 Theory of Distributive Shares: 
Selected. References
The reader who wishes to investigate Jevons' theory of
distribution further may find the following reference list
of some value:
BOOKS
Bell, J. P., A History of Economic Thought. New York: 
Ronald, 1953, PP» 414-416, 507, 575-
Davenport, H. J., Value and Distribution. Chicago: Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, 1908, pp. 209, 290-95.
Eckard, E. W., The Economics of W. S. Jevons. Washington, 
D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940,
pp. 25-51.
Ferguson, J. M., Landmarks of Economic Thought. London: 
Longmans, 1938, pp. 161-162, 165, 182.
Howey, R. S., The Rise of the Marginal Utility School,
1870-1889. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas
Press, I960, pp. 58-59.
Hutchison, T. W., A Review of Economic Doetrines, 1870-1929 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953, 44-46.
Jevons, W. S., The Principle of Economics. London: Mac­
Millan, 1905, PP. 67-85, 98-120.
, The Theory of Political Economy. New York: 
Kelley & Hillman, 1957, pp. 167-273.
Kinloch, T. F., Six English Economists. London: Gee, 1933
pp. 64-65.
Mitchell, W. C., Lecture Notes on Types of Economic Theory. 
New York: Kelley, 1949, pp. 41-46.
-116-
-117-
Roll, E., A History of Economic Thought. Englewood. Cliffs, 
N. J.: . Prentice-Hall, 1956, ppT 382-384.
Schumpeter, J. A., History of Economic Analysis. Hew York: 
Oxford University Press, 1954-, pp. 637, 893, 902-903, 
905, 913, 927-929, 940-94-2.
Stigler, G. J., Production and Distribution Theories. New 
York: MacMillan, 1941, pp. 13-37, 98.
ARTICLES AND ESSAYS
Black, R. D», "Jevons and Cairnes," Economica, August,
I960, pp. 225-226.
Jevons, H. S., "William Stanley Jevons: His Scientific
Contributions," Econometrics, July, 1934-, pp. 234—236.
Jevons, W. S., "A Brief Account of a General Mathematical 
Theory of Political Economy," pp. 284— 287•
Robertson, R. M., "Jevons and His Precursors," Econometrics, 
July, 1951, PP. 24-8-24-9.
APPENDIX C
Correspondence
In Appendix ¥ (p. 333) to the Theory of Political Econ­
omy Jevons allndes to the fact that he employed intersecting 
supply and demand curves in his lectures at Owens College 
(1863). If this is correct, it would shed new light upon 
the question of priority in the graphic approach.,, Since 
none of Jevons* published works contain such supply-demand 
diagrams, the author has attempted to ascertain whether or 
not Jevons included these graphs in manuscripts which have 
not been reproduced. Letters of correspondence in this 
regard are duplicated below:
October 19, i960
Dear Sirs:
As a student currently engaged in research into 
the writings of William Stanley Jevons, I would 
inquire whether any of his unpublished manu­
scripts are available through________________ .
Mr. Augustus Kelley of Kelley & Hillman, Inc., 
suggests that Jevons* lectures might have been 
privately reproduced and proposes that I contact 
you in this regard.
Yours truly,
D. P. Cole 
********
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The Library
University of Liverpool 
Liverpool 3 
November 11, I960
Dear Mr. Cole,
I have been unable to trace a private reproduc­
tion of unpublished lectures of ¥. S. Jevons.
This Library does not possess one, nor does our 
Dept, of Economics know of one. I have also 
enquired of the Bodleian Library, which keeps an 
index of photocopies held by British libraries, 
but they tell me that it records no manuscripts 
of any sort by Jevons.
I would suggest writing to the Department of 
Manuscripts, British Museum, London, W.C.I.
They may be able to tell you where Jevons lec­
tures are to be found.
Yours sincerely,
D. T. Cook
Curator of Special Collections
Department of Manuscripts 
British Museum 
London, W.C.I.
23rd November, I960
Dear Sir,
The Keeper of Manuscripts has asked me to reply 
to your letter of 17th November.
No lecture notes of W. S. Jevons are listed in 
the published Catalogue of Additions to the Man­
uscripts in the British Museum. There is as yet 
no published index to MSS. acquired by this 
Department since 1930, but so far as I can see, 
they include no lecture notes of Jevons.
Yours faithfully,
M.S.P. Borrie 
Assistant Keeper
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